by Ishaan Tharoor* – The Washington Post
Analysis Interpretation of the news based on evidence, including data, as well as anticipating how events might unfold based on past events
At the end of his visit to the United States last week, French President Emmanuel Macron offered a bit of candor. Despite his entreaties, Macron suspected that President Trump would choose to eventually pull out of the nuclear deal with Iran. The move, said the French president, would have little to do with Middle East geopolitics.
“My view … is that he will get rid of this deal on his own for domestic reasons,” Macron told reporters, while cautioning that jettisoning the agreement would be “insane in the medium to long-term.”
Macron’s conclusion — that Trump is mostly driven to fulfill his campaign promises (and systematically unravel the legacy of his predecessor) — is hardly a novel insight. But it’s still apt, especially as Trump champions the cause of diplomacy with North Korea while decrying diplomatic efforts toward Iran.
Trump hails his administration’s campaign of “maximum pressure” on North Korea, which he claims formed the backdrop to Friday’s historic meeting between North Korean despot Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The summit, which took place on the South Korean side of the DMZ, has led to positive noises about the “denuclearization” of the peninsula and optimism about Trump’s own planned meeting with Kim.
But if Trump’s stated agenda with North Korea comes to fruition, it may not look that different from the nuclear pact he seems intent on scrapping. The deal forged between Iran and a group of world powers in 2015 followed not just months of concerted negotiations, but years of wider diplomacy to squeeze Tehran and bring it to the table.
Even though the pact has effectively curbed Tehran’s nuclear program, its critics in the Trump administration say it granted Iran economic relief while doing nothing to curtail its wider role in the Middle East’s various conflicts. Yet, at the same time, the White House is possibly creating a scenario in which Kim can win similar concessions for North Korea without doing much to reform his tyrannical rule.
There’s a fair dose of speculation now on what may follow with the North Koreans. Pyongyang made a few goodwill gestures over the weekend, including a promise to dismantle its key nuclear-test site. But a host of analysts remain skeptical of the potential for a genuine breakthrough. There have been other false dawns with North Korea in recent history, they point out, and there’s still a wide gulf in how both sides envision “denuclearization” taking place.
They also suggest that Trump’s potential reneging of the Iran deal will shadow negotiations with Kim. “It is difficult to imagine America’s allies once again investing Washington with the authority they handed it over Iran,” wrote Max Fisher of the New York Times. “Trump is asking Washington’s Asian allies to follow his lead on North Korea just as he is defying European allies who are pushing him to stay in the Iran deal.”
The Trump administration rejects that idea. “I don’t think Kim Jong Un is staring at the Iran deal and saying, ‘Oh goodness, if they get out of that deal, I won’t talk to the Americans anymore,’” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters during his debut trip through the Middle East. “There are higher priorities, things that he is more concerned about than whether or not the Americans stay in the [agreement].”
Still, it’s curious that while the United States is now preparing to extend an olive branch to the North Koreans, it has placed itself on a collision course with Tehran. Iran may be a human-rights abuser at home and a destabilizing presence in the Middle East, but it is more open and tethered to the international system than the totalitarian, pariah regime in Pyongyang. And unlike North Korea, it has submitted to thorough international inspections and doesn’t actually possess nuclear weapons.
Trump himself has shown little ideological consistency here: Long before he was president, he told CNN in 2011 that talks with the Iranian leadership would be preferable to “killing millions of people.” Holly Dagres, writing for the Atlantic Council, argued that a diplomatic push by the Trump administration to engage Iranian President Hassan Rouhani would disturb the regime’s more hard-line elements, including the influential Revolutionary Guard who largely oversee Iran’s foreign proxy wars.
“Had Trump taken this nuanced approach, the hardliners in Tehran would’ve been shaken to their core. The potential of good ties with the West, particularly Washington, would hurt their standing in Iranian domestic politics. After all, part of the raison d’etre of the Islamic Republic is opposition to US ‘imperialism,'” Dagres wrote. “Instead, hardliners are counting down to the May 12 deadline for Trump to renew sanctions waivers, hoping the president follows through on his threats to withdraw from the [Iran deal]. This would validate their argument that Iran can never trust the U.S. to keep its commitments.”
Perhaps the Trump administration wants this atmosphere of confrontation. Both Pompeo and Trump’s national security adviser, John Bolton, have called for regime change in Iran. Neither are placing much faith in a nuclear deal with North Korea.
On Sunday, Bolton said the administration was pursuing “the Libya model” with Pyongyang, referring to a process started in 2003 that pressured then-Libyan dictator Moammar Gaddafi to give up his nuclear, chemical and long-range missile program. It was a curious analogy, given that the North Koreans point to Gaddafi’s death at the hands of a NATO-backed rebellion as justification for maintaining their own nuclear arsenal.
“It was fully exposed before the world that ‘Libya’s nuclear dismantlement,’ much touted by the U.S. in the past,” North Korea’s state media said in 2011, “turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed the former with such sweet words as ‘guarantee of security’ and ‘improvement of relations’ to disarm itself and then swallowed it up by force.”
Some analysts suggest that Bolton and his cohort are explicitly setting the table for talks to collapse. “Bolton is willing to entertain some period of negotiations for the sole purpose that, when they fail, he can discredit diplomacy and push for more aggressive solutions,” wrote arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis.
That may allow Trump another potshot at Barack Obama, the president who was ever wary of “aggressive solutions.” But critics are right to be worrying about its profound risks.
*Ishaan Tharoor writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post. He previously was a senior editor and correspondent at Time magazine, based first in Hong Kong and later in New York.
Freezing & Reversing North Korea’s Nuclear Advances
By Daryll G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association*
WASHINGTON DC, Apr 30 2018 (IPS) – For most of the past year, North Korea’s provocative long-range missile launches and a high-yield nuclear test, combined with the reckless threats of “fire and fury” and “preventive war” from the White House, have raised tensions and increased the threat of a catastrophic conflict in the region. Some of us warned that nuclear war was closer than at any point since the Cold War.
Now, in an extraordinary turnaround, an uneasy détente has emerged. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un announced on Jan. 1 that he wants to ease tensions with South Korea, and high-level talks between officials of the two governments were held in advance of the Winter Olympics.
Through South Korean intermediaries, Kim extended a summit offer to U.S. President Donald Trump, who, to the surprise of many, immediately accepted. Although Trump deserves credit for being so bold as to agree, the North Korean nuclear problem will not be resolved in one meeting, especially if he goes off-script, acts impulsively, or carries unrealistic expectations.
The direct dialogue is overdue, it is historic, and it carries high stakes. Trump and his entire national security team must understand that this diplomacy will require preparation, patience, and persistence.
To succeed, they must maintain a principled but balanced approach closely coordinated with key allies in Seoul and partners in Beijing. Further, Washington will need to address Pyongyang’s own security and economic concerns.
So far, so good. The North Koreans have expressed a willingness to consider denuclearization if their national security can be guaranteed. Reportedly, the North Koreans have said that they will not demand the removal of all U.S. forces in South Korea.
Further, Kim announced April 21 that he is suspending ballistic missile and nuclear testing, is closing the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, and will “join the international desire and efforts for the total halt” to nuclear tests. South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Kim reaffirmed their intentions at their successful—and historic—inter-Korean summit April 27.
Kim is clearly confident about his position going into the summit with Trump, and he appears to be preparing his people for potential additional steps toward denuclearization if U.S. leaders negotiate in good faith and can deliver on their promises.
The table is finally set for a meaningful, sustained dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang on verifiable denuclearization, normalizing diplomatic ties, and negotiating a formal end to the Korean War.
Key near-term U.S. goals should be to solidify North Korea’s testing suspension, to bring about a halt to its fissile material production, to win the release of three captive U.S. citizens, and to discuss measures to further reduce tensions on the divided peninsula.
North Korea’s no-nuclear-testing pledge is very significant. The North already has a proven high-yield warhead design, but additional tests could be used to achieve military and technical advances.
Leaders in Washington, Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, and elsewhere should seek to solidify Pyongyang’s nuclear testing suspension by securing its signature and ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, along with a confidence-building visit by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.
Solidifying a halt to further ballistic missile tests is also crucial because it can possibly stop the North Koreans just short of developing a reliable system to deliver their high-yield warhead. Halting production of fissile material and verifying the freeze is the next logical step, as it would put a ceiling on the potential number of nuclear devices North Korea could assemble.
If Trump could achieve all of this, it would be a major breakthrough, even if falls short of the more sweeping task of negotiating the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. But Rome was not built in a day.
To achieve the many additional steps toward the long-term goal of denuclearization of the peninsula and a durable peace regime, the Trump-Kim summit should also produce agreement on a balanced framework for sustained, direct, high-level negotiations on these and possibly other issues.
Trump has said that he will not repeat the mistakes of the past negotiations; likewise, Kim said April 27 that he doesn’t want a repeat of the past “where we were unable to fulfill our agreements.” Indeed, previous agreements had been partially successful in curbing North Korea’s capabilities, but fell apart in later stages of implementation.
These negotiations will demand even greater persistence, patience and political will. Kim’s nuclear and missile capabilities are more substantial and dangerous today, his bargaining power is greater, and the cost of failure is higher. And if Trump is foolish enough to withdraw from the successful 2015 multilateral nuclear deal with Iran, Kim will be more reluctant to make concessions.
Members of Congress, for their part, should demand clarity about the administration’s strategy and regular reports on the negotiations. Yet, they should refrain from demanding specific outcomes or immediate results. The stakes are too high and the opportunity too great for such games.
Now, after a period of reckless nuclear brinksmanship, the hard work of pursuing disarmament diplomacy begins. Can Team Trump pull this off? As the president often says, “We will see.” It will not come easy, but it is better than the alternatives.
*The link to the editorial in the May issue of the journal Arms Control Today: