By Ramesh Jaura* – rjaura.substack.com
Why “Benevolent” Authoritarianism Is Gaining Global Appeal.
For decades after World War II, liberal democracy seemed like the final chapter in political evolution. Western governments struck a balance—combining elections with social safety nets, dynamic markets with civil liberties, and global cooperation with internal stability. Newly independent countries were told that the path to progress led through Washington or Westminster. By the 1990s, many believed democracy had won.
Now, that confidence has crumbled. Western democracies are under visible strain—entrenched partisan warfare, collapsing public trust, deepening cultural rifts, the normalisation of nationalist rhetoric, and a never-ending sense of crisis fueled by social media. Terms like “civil war,” once relegated to the fringes of political discourse, are now part of mainstream conversation.
This turbulence does more than tarnish the West’s reputation—it threatens democracy itself by transforming what was once a global model into a cautionary tale. In the void, alternative systems are gaining ground—ones that promise order, efficiency, and growth without the messiness of liberal pluralism. The danger is not just that authoritarian regimes gain appeal, but that democracies inadvertently become their strongest argument.
From Exported Ideal to Embattled Practice
The post-war democratic deal was built on practical foundations: capitalism tempered by social welfare, openness backed by strong institutions, and security maintained through alliances and international law. As long as the tide of prosperity lifted most boats, tensions could be managed. Even during the Cold War, this democratic model possessed massive soft power—it didn’t just deter adversaries; it also attracted the undecided.
But prosperity was never evenly shared, and globalisation widened the gap. Jobs moved offshore, hollowing out manufacturing towns and the communities built around them. At the same time, migrant labour filled service roles in developed economies. For many, the past 30 years have felt like a double blow: economic security has eroded, and neighbourhoods have been transformed quickly. Governments struggled to support those left behind, while elites often made integration sound easier than it was.
There is nothing inevitable about this leading to democratic decay. However, when economic hardship collides with rapid cultural shifts and institutions fail to respond, populists step in—promising to protect “the people” from “the system.” In today’s digital age, outrage spreads faster than compromise. The very freedoms that underpin democracy—free speech, open association, and technological innovation—are now also fueling division and the spread of disinformation. Democracies are not collapsing because people reject liberty; they are faltering because their institutions can’t manage the side effects of freedom.
Three Fronts of the Western Crack-Up
Values: Liberalism emphasises individual rights and diversity, while populism focuses on heritage and social unity. Both have a place in a democracy—but when each side sees the other as illegitimate, democracy frays. Healthy pluralism means disagreeing without demonising. Yet today, the West increasingly chooses excommunication over conversation.
Immigration: Though rich countries need migrants, rapid or poorly managed immigration can overwhelm local infrastructure. The liberal argument—that migrants support growth and reflect moral responsibility—remains a valid one. But ignoring concerns about pace, law enforcement, and assimilation hands the debate to extremists. When people feel that borders are out of control, it quickly becomes an issue of identity.
Foreign Policy: Institutions like NATO, the EU, and the WTO once symbolised stability and competence. Today, amid job losses and military entanglements, they’re often seen as symbols of elitism. Treaties benefit “them,” while citizens deal with trade shocks. When liberal leaders struggle to explain how globalism benefits ordinary people, nationalism wins the narrative.
These fault lines reinforce each other. Identity-based politics turns borders into civilisational frontiers. Economic populism paints trade as betrayal. Institutions like courts, media, and election agencies become battlegrounds rather than neutral ground. And once trust in referees is lost, so is acceptance of the game’s outcomes.
Democracy’s Recurrent Weaknesses: A Brief History
Today’s democratic turmoil has echoes in history.
Athens: The birthplace of democracy tied citizen participation to imperial ambition. As the war dragged on, fear and internal strife took over. The city veered between radical populism and elite coups. Eventually, democracy gave way to more stable—but less free—forms of rule. The lesson: democracy can’t survive endless polarisation or strategic overreach.
Rome: The Roman Republic built a system of checks and balances, but inequality, elite rivalry, and militarisation wore it down. Political factions weaponised institutions until those very institutions broke. Caesar’s claim to restore the republic effectively brought it to an end. Augustus brought order and growth—but at the price of political freedom.
Weimar Germany & Interwar Europe: Germany’s democratic constitution looked ideal on paper, but economic disaster and national humiliation eroded faith in the system. After WWI, Germany was forced to pay heavy reparations under the harsh Treaty of Versailles, and experienced severe economic problems like hyperinflation and unemployment, which destabilised the new democratic Weimar Republic. The country also faced a militarized and restricted military and ongoing political instability from both right- and left-wing groups. Extremists used democratic tools to dismantle democracy itself.
Similar patterns unfolded across Europe. Authoritarians promised stability, revival, and competence—and too many people took the deal.
These aren’t predictions, but patterns. When democracies fail to balance diversity with unity—or protect people from long-term hardship—they don’t just lose elections. They lose legitimacy.
When the Model Becomes a Warning
For decades, the West’s democratic example carried weight. Aid, trade, and prestige were tied to “good governance,” with the assumption that Western systems could be replicated.
But now, the outside world sees dysfunction: political brinkmanship, contested elections, polarised public health debates, incoherent migration systems, a media ecosystem riddled with conspiracy theories, and courts that appear to be political tools. Once-marginal parties are now mainstream.
Authoritarian sceptics of democracy no longer need theories. They just need to point to the West and ask: “If they can’t govern themselves, why should we copy them?”
The Allure of “Benevolent” Authoritarianism
As democracy stumbles, alternative systems are stepping in—not just as rivals, but as supposed improvements.
China: The Chinese Communist Party promotes a model of one-party rule that is efficient, technocratic, and patriotic. It boasts decades of growth, significant poverty reduction, and global leadership in infrastructure. Supporters say China can act decisively—without the paralysis of political bickering. The tradeoff is less political freedom in exchange for stability and scale.
Singapore: The city-state offers a sleek version of soft authoritarianism, characterised by clean government, reliable legal systems for business, and limited political competition. Elections exist, but power remains tightly held. The payoffs are: High-quality schools, public safety, and world-class infrastructure. For many Singaporeans, it’s a fair exchange.
Rwanda: Post-genocide Rwanda centralised power quickly, suppressing dissent but delivering peace, low corruption, and steady development—the argument being that when the alternative is collapse, order must come first. Critics highlight human rights abuses, while supporters point to public services that once seemed impossible.
These models differ in size and history, but they share a central belief: prosperity and security can justify tighter control. And as the West falters, more people—not just elites—are buying into that idea.
The Asian Challenge Revisited
In the 1990s, leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad made the case for “Asian values”—encompassing order, community, and respect for authority—offering a counterpoint to Western liberalism’s emphasis on individualism and perpetual political contestation. At times, this was used to justify repression, but it also posed a serious critique: Western ideals weren’t universally applicable and might even weaken cohesion in young nations.
Some East Asian countries took a different route to democracy. South Korea and Taiwan were authoritarian during their growth phases, transitioning to democracy only after establishing strong economies and middle classes. Their journey suggests that democratic freedoms can follow, not necessarily precede, development. China, of course, insists it doesn’t need that second step at all.
As Western credibility erodes, the “Asian values” debate is back. For countries in the Global South, the question isn’t whether democracy is morally superior—it’s whether it delivers results.
India’s Strategic View in a Fractured West
India is caught in the middle of this global shift. Its diaspora has flourished in liberal societies. Its economy depends on an open world. Its diplomacy leans toward Western democracies, even as it fiercely protects its autonomy.
But Western polarisation complicates things. Anti-immigration sentiment restricts Indian talent. Protectionist policies pose a threat to India’s emerging export strategies. Human rights critiques from the West often feel politically selective to Delhi. Meanwhile, Asia’s “strong state” models offer a different roadmap: build capacity first, then establish democracy.
Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan offers clear advice: stop treating “the West” as a monolithic entity. India must engage strategically with each country’s internal politics and build ties across party lines. In a West divided against itself, India must learn to talk to everyone.
The Global South’s Choices
For many developing nations, Western prescriptions have always felt out of touch. Aid conditions assumed bureaucratic capacity that didn’t exist. Imported policies ignored local realities.
Now, leaders are saying what many long believed: they need competent governance, not performative pluralism. People want infrastructure that is built, police who respond, and courts that function. If limited political competition delivers that, the public may accept it.
But that choice comes with costs. Authoritarian “efficiency” often leads to unchecked corruption, unfixable policy errors, and repression disguised as discipline. For every Singapore, there are plenty of regimes that delivered neither order nor prosperity.
Still, Western dysfunction has shifted the bar. Fifteen years ago, diplomats could claim that democracy and development went hand in hand. Today, leaders in the Global South are more likely to respond: “Show me.”
Can Liberal Democracy Recover?
Experts say: Yes—but only by doing the hard, unglamorous work that once gave it strength. Five key fixes are considered essential:
1. Re-centre material security: People must feel their lives are improving. That means investing in industry, supporting workers, addressing inequality, and ensuring fair taxes.
2. Rebuild state capacity: Governments must be able to function. Efficient public services are the backbone of freedom.
3. Regulate the attention economy: Tech platforms can’t continue profiting from unchecked outrage. Transparency, data access, and reduced friction can foster healthier debate.
4. Restore credible referees: Courts, election bodies, public broadcasters, and statistical agencies must be protected from political interference.
5. Practice democratic patriotism: Liberalism needs a story of belonging. A civic nationalism based on shared institutions and equal dignity can outcompete both global detachment and toxic nationalism.
These changes don’t guarantee success—but they turn democracy from a lifestyle brand into a real solution for shared problems.
What “Benevolent” Authoritarians Get Right—and Wrong
Authoritarian regimes often begin with genuine grievances. They correctly recognise that people want safety, stability, and effective government. And they’re right that democracies often underdeliver.
But they go too far in assuming that shrinking freedom is the only way to build capacity. The East Asian story suggests otherwise: strong institutions can come first—but rising middle classes eventually demand a voice. Authoritarian systems that refuse to evolve stop treating people as partners—and start treating them as passive recipients.
The West’s biggest threat isn’t losing a debate—it’s losing the power of example. If democracies can’t deliver on housing, infrastructure, education, and fair elections, others will turn to systems that can.
*Ramesh Jaura is a journalist with 60 years of experience as a freelancer, head of Inter Press Service, and founder-editor of IDN-InDepthNews. His work draws on field reporting and coverage of international conferences and events.