By Pham Quang Hien* – Modern Diplomacy
The concept of a “Global South” has made a prominent comeback in strategic discussions since the COVID-19 pandemic and especially after the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The concept of a “Global South” has made a prominent comeback in strategic discussions since the COVID-19 pandemic and especially after the Russia-Ukraine conflict. With the increasing presence of groups such as BRICS, G77, ASEAN, the African Union (AU), and the Latin American Community (CELAC), a “multipolar” world seems to be taking shape. But the contentious issue is not the rise of this phenomenon but the question: will the South truly become a force capable of shaping the international order—or will it remain merely a symbolic discourse lacking intrinsic cohesion?
Over the past two years, the discourse of a “Global South” has emerged more strongly than ever. This phrase has not only been repeated in speeches by leaders from India, South Africa, Brazil, and Indonesia but has also resonated at powerful forums such as the G20, BRICS, and the United Nations. The common denominator in these messages is the desire to reform the current international order, where developing nations aspire to regain their rightful place and voice in the global power sphere.
At the 2023 BRICS Expanded Summit in Johannesburg, a first-ever institutional step forward was witnessed: BRICS not only expanded its membership but also clearly stated its ambition to become an economic and political superpower to replace the Western order. Initiatives such as the BRICS payment currency, the New Development Bank (NDB) development fund, and bilateral currency swap agreements are being implemented as initial steps to create a parallel existence with Western-led institutions.
However, presence does not equate to strategic strength. The South is more present, but their level of cohesion, in terms of values, interests, and actions, remains quite fragmented.
The inherent diversity of the global South makes it difficult for this concept to crystallize into a unified political and strategic entity. Under the same name, we see profound disparities between emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil and small, vulnerable nations in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. Differences in scale, development models, and strategic orientations mean their interests are not only inconsistent but, in many cases, contradictory, making the “South” a space of simmering competition rather than a genuine bloc.
India, for example, is striving to position itself as a representative voice of the Southern Hemisphere while simultaneously forging closer ties with the West through mechanisms such as the Quad and the G20. Meanwhile, China, despite consistently advocating for a multipolar world order, faces growing criticism from African and ASEAN nations regarding its “debt trap” investment policies and expansionist actions in the South China Sea. Even within BRICS, Beijing’s overwhelming influence has led to concerns that the bloc is gradually becoming a “second West” with Chinese characteristics.
Furthermore, the lack of a shared set of values, such as principles of democracy, transparency, or good governance, continues to be a major obstacle to efforts to build consensus within the Global South. While some countries pursue development models based on free markets and deep integration, such as Chile and Kenya, many others maintain protectionist, centralized, and closed policies. Differences in political and religious backgrounds, ranging from Islam, Hinduism, and Orthodox Christianity to Chinese-style atheism, further complicate the picture. These disparities make the prospect of coordinating a common foreign policy for the “Global South” fragile, if not almost impossible.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that efforts to foster connectivity are increasing. The South-South Cooperation Forum within the framework of the United Nations, the NAM Summit (Non-Aligned Movement), and the Global South Summit hosted by India have created new spaces for sharing development experiences, promoting economic cooperation, and expressing common views on global institutional reform. Several new initiatives, such as the ASEAN Climate Change Centres Network, the post-COVID recovery fund, and the ASEAN Digital Agreement, are expanding the axis of intra-regional cooperation.
However, for these efforts to be strategic, the Southern countries need to overcome their own limitations. They need to reposition their relationship with the West, not with a confrontational mindset, but with confidence and initiative. At the same time, they need to embrace diversity in their approaches while still building on respect for international law, aligning with global trends in financial institutional reform, and working together to enhance their resilience to the climate crisis.
In this context, middle-sized countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, Mexico, and Chile emerge as crucial links, acting as bridges not only between Southern countries but also between the Southern and Northern hemispheres. With relatively stable political systems, sustainable economic growth, and extensive experience in multilateral mechanisms, they have the potential to become “mediator states,” helping to bridge the gap of interests, interpret differences, and foster dialogue in an increasingly fragmented world.
The Global South is rising, of course; there’s no doubt about that. But to become a force shaping the world order, they need more than a constant presence. They need connections, the ability to propose solutions, and above all, they need to build strategic trust among themselves. Otherwise, the Global South will remain merely a metaphor reflecting aspirations rather than actual power.
*Pham Quang Hien, student of International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV).