By Jorge Heine* – Article sent to Other News by the author
The Munich Security Conference (MSC) held each February at the Bayerischer Hof, Bavaria’s capital grandest hotel, is to international security issues what Davos is to international economic ones—the year’s biggest and most significant meeting. It is there that the trans-Atlantic political, military and academic elites gather to assess the state of the world and the way forward. Joe Biden was a regular speaker in Munich throughout much of his fifty-year long Washington career. Thus, there were high expectations when it was announced that U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance would give one of the keynote addresses at the 2025 MSC. With President Trump’s campaign promise to bring the war in Ukraine to an end in 24 hours after taking office, the assumption was that the speech would lay out a peace plan to do so.
Yet, far from doing that, Vice-President Vance engaged instead in an unbridled criticism of European politics and its institutions. To a startled audience, he posited that the biggest threat to Europe did not come from Russia or China, but from within. It was European governments’ interference in elections and curbs on free speech that represented the biggest menace to the continent. In Vance’s view, European decline was rooted in an anachronistic Weltanschauung, one that prioritizes effete, if not downright effeminate, values such as the defense of human rights and of the environment, while not protecting its peoples from the much more real threat of illegal immigration. This would contrast with the more virile and muscular US approach to foreign policy. Moreover, reckless spending on the welfare state had led Europe to disregard defense budgets, thus becoming ever more reliant on the U.S. military umbrella. As if to underscore his point, Vance then met with Alice Weidel, the leader of the Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD), Germany ‘s far right-wing party, often accused of harboring Nazi sympathies, and refused to meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who was present at the conference.
Shortly thereafter, on 22 February 2025, on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, at the United Nations General Assembly, the United States voted with Russia, Belarus and North Korea against most European member states on a resolution condemning that invasion. In the following months, the Trump administration continued to support candidates of the far right in European elections, and to express disdain for Europe’s ruling coalitions. Without missing a beat, the U.S. State Department has gone so far as to publish a document rationalizing this strategy, arguing that Europe is waging an “aggressive campaign against western civilization itself”.
Thus, the very notion of “the West” has become untenable. The differences that exist today between the United States and Europe are no longer merely the long-standing ones between somewhat different varieties of capitalism—i.e. between its Anglo-Saxon type and the continental variety—but ones rooted in a very different set of values. As the United States leans ever more into isolationism, protectionism, unilateralism and authoritarianism, it finds itself increasingly at odds with a Europe in which a majority (though by no means all) of nations still hold on to at least some of the old tenets of the Liberal International Order (LIO) set up at the end of World War Two.
What lies behind this break-up of the West and what are its implications?
A world order in transition
The decline of the extant order in place for the past eighty years is rooted in the relative decline of the United States and by that of the rapid rise of China, though also by that of other rising powers—the “Rise of the Rest” in Fareed Zakaria’s term. This decline is not absolute but relative. Though the US represented 50 per cent of the world’s GDP in 1945, and this fell to 25 per cent in 1970, it still represents 25 per cent in 2025. What has changed is the presence of challengers to this hegemony—China today represents 19 per cent of the world’s GDP, and its economy is larger than that of the United States in PPP terms, and, according to some projections, will be larger in nominal terms in less than a decade. As tends to happen in history, this dynamic, between a declining hegemon and a rising power, has triggered a fierce competition between Washington and Beijing, one that has come into the open especially since 2018. This competition has escalated from a trade war to a tech war to a conflict with increasingly ideological and military connotations.
Within the United States, significant sectors blame this relative decline on globalization, on what is alleged to be unfair competition from powers like China and India, and on international arrangements that do not safeguard US interests. The worldwide tariffs imposed by the US on most of the rest of the world on 2 April 2025 (later partially rescinded) are a product of that perception. The same goes for measures such as the US leaving (once again), the Paris Accords on Climate Change, the World Health Organization and the UN Human Rights Council in the first months of 2025.
These trade wars, as well as the broader issue of Great Power competition, thus put the developing world in a bind.
What is to be done?
Active Non-Alignment as the way forward
As I argue with my co-authors Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami in our new book, THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD: STRIKING OUT IN AN ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION (Polity Press), although there is a temptation to give in to the pressures of one or another of these powers and take sides in this high-stakes contest, that would be a mistake. Rather, the answer lies in what we have called Active Non-Alignment (ANA). To avoid utter subordination to the Great Powers, weaker powers must guard their autonomy—for which ANA provides the best tools.
ANA is a foreign policy doctrine that serves as a guide to action, a compass to navigate the turbulent waters of a world undergoing massive changes. ANA takes a page from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of yesteryear but adapts it to the realities of the new century. The latter include the rise of the Asian giants (China and India) and the replacement of the diplomatie des cahiers de doleances (“victimhood diplomacy”, best expressed in the demands for a massive North-South transfer of resources embodied in the New International Economic Order, NIEO, articulated by the NAM in the seventies and eighties) of the old Third World by “collective financial statecraft”. This is how Roberts, Armijo and Katada describe the new century’s new IFIs like the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (the so-called “BRICS Bank”) and the Latin American Development Bank (the old CAF). It is a world in which South-South trade represents over 50 per cent of global trade (as opposed to a mere 20 per cent in the seventies) and in which FDI and financial cooperation no longer originate solely or even mainly in the developed North.
In this context, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, the current competition between the United States and China offers significant opportunities to developing nations. Yes, there are some similarities between today and the days of the Cold War and its bipolar world dominated by the US-USSR conflict. Still, there is a key difference. The Soviet economy was a closed economy, and much smaller than that of the United States. It thus had little to offer to what was then known as the Third World in terms of trade, FDI or financial cooperation. China’s situation, with a much larger and more open economy and policy banks like the China Development Bank and the Eximbank that can provide significant amounts of financial cooperation (as evidenced by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, that spent one trillion dollars in infrastructure projects in its first decade of existence, from 2013-2023, mostly in the Global South) is very different.
Active Non-Alignment’s grand strategy and tactics
If ANA is the foreign policy doctrine, what is its grand strategy?
The grand strategy is “playing the field”, by which is meant picking and choosing among the various issues on the country’s international agenda and test which one of the Great Powers will provide a better deal. For weaker states, the main concern is development, that is, how to grow their economy, create jobs and raise the standard of living of their population. This is very different from the priorities of the Great Powers, whose main concern is security and their defense preparedness vis a vis rival powers. At the same time, in a situation of a declining hegemon threatened by the rise of another power, there is a natural competition for the “hearts and minds” of the peoples and governments in the rest of the world. The hegemon needs to prove that it is still on top of the heap. The rising power, on the other hand, needs to show that it is up and coming in the international hierarchy.
In principle, in this competition the United States has the advantage. It has a larger economy; it can count on some of the largest and most valuable companies in the world; and it is, at least in some respects, more advanced in science and technology than China. On the other hand, given the smaller size of the U.S. public sector, for Washington it is more difficult to target resources to specific countries, than it is for Beijing—with the US depending more on the vagaries of the market. The dismantling of US AID, and its $ 70 billion international cooperation budget, in the second Trump administration, in turn, is proof positive that the United States has lost interest in humanitarian assistance as a tool of foreign policy.
There is also another dynamic at work that puts the United States on the backfoot in this contest. In reaction against declining hegemony and to the “Rise of the Rest”, there is a turn inward and a rejection of everything foreign. This translates into erecting tariffs against foreign trade, blocking foreign investment projects, deporting immigrants and otherwise championing isolationism –which is exactly what the United States is doing. The rising power, on the other hand, precisely because it is keen to demonstrate its credentials as a model of international civic behavior, does the opposite: it continues to champion free trade by way of signing bilateral and plurilateral FTAs; opens itself further to FDI; keeps up its contributions to international organizations and multilateral bodies of various kinds; and relaxes visa restrictions for foreign visitors– which is exactly what China is doing. China also puts the issue of development front and center in its dealings with the Global South.
In turn, the tactics of ANA rely on hedging, that is, a middle position between balancing and bandwagoning. The traditional assumption has been that for weaker powers there was no alternative but to “bandwagon”, that is, to align with whatever Great Power exercised most pressure, generally the one within whose sphere of influence they found themselves. Yet in today’s globalized and interdependent world, that is not necessarily the case. Hedging means covering your back, giving contradictory signals—if necessary, taking one step forward and two steps backwards—and rely on ambiguity. This is the safest way to deal with situations of high uncertainty, such as the world finds itself today, as the specter of nuclear war has once again raised its ugly head. Under such circumstances fully committing to one side or the other can entail the road to oblivion.
A tool to make the most of a difficult situation
As mentioned above, ANA is a means to an end, a tool to allow developing nations to preserve their autonomy and independence and not be subjected to the whims of the Great Powers. It should not be confused with neutrality, a term derived from international law which refers to the position taken by third parties vis a vis a particular armed conflict, and that connotes a certain degree of passivity. Nor does it equal diplomatic equidistance, a term that conveys a somewhat mechanical middle position between two Great Powers. In ANA, it is perfectly possible to be closer to one of the Great Powers on certain issues, and to another on a totally different set of issues.
That said, ANA’s application demands a highly sophisticated diplomacy, with analytical capabilities that can evaluate each issue on its merits and draw the necessary conclusions. It is a policy in which managing timing and sequencing is critical. To take sides and align yourself with one of the Great Powers is easy: you simply do as you are told. But it also means you lose all leverage. ANA, on the other hand, requires a pro-active attitude, looking out for opportunities in the international scenario, and exploit them to the fullest. It can thus be much more rewarding.
The very notion of Active Non-Alignment arose in Latin America in 2019-2020 as the region was hit by a triple whammy: the Covid-19 pandemic; the biggest economic downturn in 120 years; and US pressures to cancel China-related projects. ANA emerged as a response to the need to manage the challenges associated with such a deep-seated crisis. It resonated widely in the region. In the past few years, however, with the rise of the Global South as a significant force in world affairs (Foreign Policy Magazine proclaimed 2023 as “The Year of the Global South”) and the return of what has been called “the new non-alignment”, ANA has also reached deeply into Africa and Asia as well. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the reaction to it in the developing world; the expansion of the BRICS group (now “BRICS+”); and the widespread reaction against the war in Gaza have all propelled the Global South to the frontlines of international politics. And in many ways, the natural foreign policy doctrine of the Global South is Active Non-Alignment.
*Jorge Heine is a research professor at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. His new book, THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD : STRIKING OUT IN AN ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION, co-authored with Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami, is published by Polity Press.