By Jack Rasmus* – LA Progressive
Is it a Trump tactic to justify further US withdrawal from involvement in the war, once the Europeans reject it, and to let the Europeans have ‘their war’ with Russia in Ukraine?
This past week President Trump proposed a 28-point plan to Russia and Ukraine as a basis for negotiations to end the current Ukraine-Russia war, now approaching its fourth year.
What’s behind the Trump proposal? Is it a further revelation of verbal understandings agreed to between Trump and Putin last August in Anchorage, Alaska? Or something more?
Is it a political cover for Trump to finally cut military intelligence and surveillance aid to Ukraine—while simultaneously imposing additional sanctions on Russia, and perhaps Ukraine as well, to pressure both parties to commence negotiations in earnest?
Is it a Trump maneuver to enable the US to share in the exploitation of the $260 billion Russian assets frozen in Belgium and EU banks?
Is it a Trump tactic to justify further US withdrawal from involvement in the war, once the Europeans reject it, and to let the Europeans have ‘their war’ with Russia in Ukraine?
Is it, as some have argued, a clever ‘hard cop’ (Europe) vs. ‘soft cop’ (US) maneuver to get Russia and Putin to agree to another ‘Minsk III’-like temporary truce to halt the conflict on the ground so that Europe & Ukraine can buy time to recruit, rearm, and retrain forces in order to continue the conflict?
Or is it a preliminary step toward eventual real negotiations down the road—i.e. after further military conflict exhausts both sides creating a basis for real compromises and negotiations in 2026?
Up to the release of the 28-point proposals this past week, the fundamental positions of three of the four parties involved in the conflict—Ukraine, Russia, and Europe—have not changed much, if at all. Is Trump’s plan therefore about trying to move the parties off their prior hardened positions that prevent any serious negotiations.
Prior Positions of the Parties
To date, Russia has held firm to its June 2024 positions: No NATO in Ukraine; formal recognition by Europe-US-Ukraine of Russian sovereignty over the four provinces (Lughansk, Donestsk, Zaporozhia, Kherson) and Crimea; reduction of Ukraine armed forces to less than 100,000 to ensure no future threat to Russia; and Ukraine neutrality and denazification of its government.
Ukraine’s position has been the same since the onset of the conflict in 2022: no Ukraine land concessions including Crimea; reparations for Russian damages; full retreat of all Russian military forces to Ukraine’s 1991 borders; and no negotiations to begin until a ceasefire and Russia’s full retreat.
Europe’s position is full support for Ukraine’s positions; an immediate ceasefire along the lines of combat as precondition to negotiations; use of Russia’s $260 billion frozen assets in its banks to fund Ukraine’s war effort in the interim and thereafter for Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction post-war; no changes to borders as a result of force; Europe troops to be allowed in Ukraine after the war ends; and no limits to NATO expansion determined by any state outside NATO member states.
The US position under Biden agreed with the European and Ukrainian positions above virtually completely. Biden proposed, moreover, to continue to escalate US financial, weaponry, and military assistance for as long as it takes to force Russia to end the war.
Under Trump, the US position shifted, to seek negotiations and to end the war on terms of whatever is eventually acceptable by Russia, Europe and Ukraine—as dictated by the relationship of forces at the time of final negotiations.
Trump and the US have therefore swung between a solution preferred by the political alliance of US neocons, Europe leaders, and Ukraine to a solution advocated by other political forces within the US who have begun recognizing the impossibility of ending the war on the basis of Europe-Ukraine positions to date. Trump’s dual representatives reflect the duality of the US position: General Kellogg representing the US neocon/EU positions and Trump’s personal advisor, Steve Witkoff, the emerging more realist US view of the conflict.
US Vice-President, J.D. Vance, summarized this latter, realist view when questioned by US media this past weekend after the release of Trump’s 28-Point Plan: the rigid Europe-Ukraine hardline view of the past three and a half years represents the view of “failed diplomats or politicians living in fantasy land” committed to the idea that somehow “more money, more weapons, or more sanctions” will result in eventual “victory”!
The US wants to move on from Europe’s war with Russia in Ukraine. Its imperial interests now include larger strategic concerns in the middle east (Israel-GAZA-Iran war), Latin America (Venezuela regime change plans), and western Pacific (Taiwan-China). The emerging new view is that if Europe wants to continue war with Russia, they should do so on their own, paying for it and providing Ukraine’s the military support themselves. The new view beginning to take hold among the Trump wing of the US foreign policy elite is that the USA has more important global strategic interests and concerns beyond continuing fighting and paying for Europe’s wars or protecting Europe from its imagined threat from Russia.
Mainstream Media Complicity
The US and Europe mainstream media throughout the conflict since 2022 reflected the US neocon view that Russia’s economy was about to collapse, Putin would be overthrown by Russian political opponents, and the Russian army was weak and would quickly stop fighting. The most recent such view is that Russia has suffered 1.5 million losses since 2022—a number even larger than the current total Russian military of 1.4 million.
Following the announcement of the 28-Point plan, the New York Times provided a brief, incomplete and slanted summary of its terms. In its very first paragraph, it described the Trump plan as one in which “Ukraine would have to capitulate on most of Putin’s demands” and that “Ukraine would gain little other than a halt to the war”. The Times’ authors added “Russia’s economy is at its weakest since February 2022” and that Russia is facing serious economic pressures due to US sanctions—all of which is a repeat of the propaganda mantra and remains contrary to the facts stated by various western market research sources. Another Times theme is that the Trump requirement Ukraine hold elections is about “ushering out” Zelensky—a political goal attributed to Putin.
These themes were reiterated by the European media in turn and then some. The UK Guardian clarified several important elements of the plan conveniently ignored by the New York Times. For example, it questioned who originally authored the plan? It suggested the Plan was perhaps Russia’s originally, and was passed off by US Secretary State, Rubio, as Trump’s plan. The attempt here clearly was to undermine the plan and the US role, suggesting the US was just a dupe for Russia. Rubio immediately denied the suggestion, called the Times’ suggestion “blatantly wrong” and confirmed it was a US plan, not Russia’s, reached after US discussions with both Ukraine and Russia.
That did not stop US neocon Senators from repeating the Times’ theme publicly as well, implying the plan was Russia’s not Trump’s.
Key Elements of the 28-Point Plan
The plan is now public and readers can review it in detail for themselves. However, the key elements are the following:
1. Ukraine must withdraw from the two provinces, Lughansk and Donetsk. It has already been driven out of Lughansk and occupies only 25% left of Donetsk. Moreover, the area from which it withdraws in those two provinces is to remain a demilitarized zone. So per the plan Ukraine is not required to actually recognized either as Russian sovereignty.
2. Russia must withdraw all its forces from the northern provinces of Sumy and Kharkov. Its forces in Zaporozhie and Kherson are to be frozen in place, the rest of those two provinces remaining occupied by Ukraine.
3. The plan calls for no NATO troops deployed in Ukraine and no further NATO expansion (the latter point left unclear as to where exactly no expansion was to occur). Ukraine can join the European Union.
4. Sanctions on Russia would be removed in steps. Russia was allowed to join the G7 as its new G8 member.
5. The size of Ukraine’s current 900,000 military forces would be capped at 600,000.
6. $100 billion of Russia’s $260 billion frozen assets in Europe banks would be transferred to a joint US-Russia administered fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war. To which Europe will add another $100 billion but not administer.
7. Elections in Ukraine would be held within 100 days after the final agreement to end the war.
8. There were also numerous vague terms calling for restoration of Russian speaking Ukrainians cultural and political rights prior to the new elections.
Europe leaders initially expressed extreme displeasure with not being part of the determining of the plan, cut out of negotiations with Russia, and especially with having to provide $100 billion of Russia’s frozen assets to the joint US-Russian fund and then another $100 billion further to the reconstruction of Ukraine.
Thus, the European and US have begun early in-fighting over the spoils available after the end of the war. Whose corporations will receive the lion’s share of the proceeds from reconstruction has begun emerging as a source of contention within the NATO forces, US and European.
Responses to the 28-Point Plan
Russia has said the 28-point proposal is a basis upon which to start negotiations. Europe has initially rejected it and it hurriedly gathered its leaders in Geneva on November 23, 2025 to craft its official rejection and alternative proposal. Zelensky and Ukraine once again took cover behind the European opposition to the latest Trump initiative, declaring its opposition to the plan as well.
Europe and Ukraine have consistently insisted that negotiations should only take place when Russia agrees to an unconditional ceasefire along all lines of combat. Ceasefire first and freezing all lines of military contact is the precondition to start negotiations. That remains the fundamental Europe-Ukraine demand, which it has been since 2022. By demanding ceasefire first, then negotiations, Europe-Ukraine in effect propose a repeat of Minsk II negotiations held in 2015 to halt Russian military activity. They want a ‘Minsk III’.
As former British diplomat, Alaistair Crooke, has explained, “they (Europe) want a ceasefire, not a solution, so they can go back in, retrain, and rearm Ukraine to continue the war”. He adds: “Europe is coaching Zelensky to say No” and it wants to continue a “controlled war”.
German Chancellor, Merz, warned if Ukraine loses it will have a profound impact on Europe politics as a whole. That’s true. Europe’s current political elite have tied their futures to the war in Ukraine and cannot retreat. To do so risks the possible fracturing of NATO and even perhaps the European Union. So why are Europe leaders like Merz, Macron in France, and Starmer in the UK so committed to continuing the war? There are several possible explanations.
First, the war is the way to keep the USA financially, and even militarily, committed to remain in NATO in Europe. The USA military umbrella since 1945 has been profitable for Europe and politically useful for Europe’s domestic politics: not having to expend huge sums on defense (US total cost in NATO is now estimated at $32B per year) has enabled Europe to provide social benefits to its populace much greater than the US has provided to its populace.
Should the USA pull out of Europe—which Trump likely wants to do eventually to cut $32B from future US defense spending—then Europe will have to cut social benefits, raise taxes further, and/or incur more sovereign debt, in order to develop its own defense/war military industrial complex. Merz has already declared Germany will spend $1 trillion over the next five years to do so. Other European countries will have to do the same. Europe’s economy cannot sustain that expenditure without massive cuts to social benefits that will certainly result in widespread political upheaval. Europe’s economy has been limping along since 2008, growing tepidly, experiencing bouts of stagnation and mild recessions for the last decade and a half, and has been declining in terms of productivity for some time. Real wages have not risen since at least 1999 when the European Union was created.
Europe has been steadily falling behind the US and China technologically and financially. European leaders may think a surge in military spending will energize its GDP and growth but that route holds great economic and political risks. European leaders are likely aware of the consequences. But they see continuing the war as the way to keep US involved supporting the war, to keep US in NATO providing its subsidies, and the way to buy time to transition to their own military-industrial economy. The Ukraine war is key to buy time for this economic transition. Continued war in Ukraine is the only way for Europe’s elites to justify the social benefit cuts on the agenda.
As UK diplomat Alastair Crooke has correctly observed, Europe needs the war to continue. Ukraine and Zelensky will ride the European horse into the sunset as long as they can.
Failure to end the Ukraine war is not a problem of individuals—Zelensky, or Putin, or Trump or even the ultra-nationalist/neo-nazi elements in the Ukraine government. The problem is Europe—and Europe’s US neocon allies who share its pro-war objectives as well. European leadership is committed to a long war in Ukraine, so long as Ukraine has the troops to throw into the maelstrom. However, that may be coming to an end sooner than later.
The European leadership met this past Sunday, November 23, to hammer out a response to Trump’s 28 Pts. They will inject their own demands into a new document. In essence, some new formulation of ‘ceasefire first’ and other new demands.
According to the Guardian newspaper, they will propose to amend the 28 Pt plan to include a reduction in Ukraine military forces by only 100,000 to 800,000 instead of the 600,000 indicated in Trump’s plan—neither of which Russia will agree to. They will demand the Zaporozhie nuclear power plan now occupied by Russia to be returned to Ukraine. They’ll oppose immediate reductions of sanctions on Russia or permit it in the G8. They’ll especially reject the US-Russia joint administered fund to reconstruct Ukraine. They won’t agree to no NATO in Ukraine and will reiterate European forces must be allowed in Ukraine after the war. Reports are circulating they may even call for the US to commit troops to ‘supervise’ the truce on the ground after the war, i.e. to lure the US to provide cover for future European military encroachments. Their amendments will thus constitute a ‘ceasefire’ plan, albeit couched in more clever proposals. All of which Russia will reject.
Trump’s response to Europe’s counterproposals will likely include his acceptance of whatever the Europeans propose at Geneva. He’s as much as said so. The 28-point plan, even with the European amendments, is just an interim document and another false start event—an ‘Anchorage 2.0’—on the road to a later more serious negotiation.
When asked by the media he admitted the plan is not the ‘final agreement’. And when queried in turn what he’ll do if Zelensky rejects it, Trump replied: “he’ll have to like it, or just keep fighting, I guess.”
Strategically the best the US and Trump can get from the Plan is to move Ukraine and Europe off their nearly four years-long hardline positions. To create some ‘hooks’ upon which to hang future negotiations.
True negotiations will not begin until Russia takes back all the four provinces it has declared as part of sovereign Russia. Serious discussions begin only when Russia takes back all of the four provinces, stands at the Dnipr river and decides whether or not to push further west into Ukraine or to take Odessa in the south. At that point the ‘Special Military Operation’, SMO, becomes something else. Something much larger. Alternatively, realistic negotiations might begin if and when the Ukraine army begins to collapse before Russia reaches the Dnipr, which could happen within the next 90 days given the current rate of Russian advances on the ground in the east.
The Institute for War (IFW), a western think tank clearly allied with NATO and Ukraine, has reported up to 300,000 Ukrainian troops have deserted since the war began. At least another 500,000 have been killed or permanently disabled. Per the IFW Ukraine is recruiting 17,000 troops per month but is losing 30,000. Russian volunteers (not draftees as in Ukraine) are joining its military at the rate of roughly 30,000/ month and its losses are much less than its recruitment. The ultimate limit to war is not finding enough money to pay for it. Nor even enough weapons. It is the manpower losses.
The war in Ukraine will end when the military conflict ends. Not vice versa—that is, not as result of a ceasefire ending the conflict before negotiating the terms of its ending.
The Trump 28-point plan will not begin the process of ending the war. On the contrary, the inevitable collapse of the plan may well lead to more escalation, not less.
*Jack Rasmus is author of the recently published book, ‘The Scourge of Neoliberalism: US Economic Policy from Reagan to Trump’, Clarity Press, 2020. He publishes at Predicting the Global Economic Crisis.