By Massimo Nava – Editorialist, Il Corriere della Sera
Putin’s condemnation of the war, with its trail of crimes and endless suffering inflicted on the civilian population, has no extenuating circumstances on a moral level and in relation to international law, which does not provide for permission to invade a sovereign state. But for the judgment of history, the geopolitical genesis of the conflict also matters. And in this regard, it is worth retracing some of the stages with the help of a source not suspicious of Kremlin sympathies: the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs.
It is 2014, when the issue of Ukraine is beginning to make chancelleries break out in cold sweats. It is an analysis that contributes to the realization that, as in any war, there is a present (in which the hierarchy of blame is quite obvious) and there is a past (in which the hierarchy of responsibility must also be considered). As for the future, it seems as dull as the sun at midnight.
Foreign Affairs, in 2014, reconstructed the genesis of the Ukrainian crisis as follows. “President Putin, it is argued, annexed Crimea to resurrect the Soviet empire, and could take it out on the rest of Ukraine. But this view is wrong: the United States and European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The root of the problem is NATO enlargement, a central element of a strategy to bring Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s eastward expansion and the West’s support for the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine since the Orange Revolution in 2004 have also been critical elements. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have opposed NATO enlargement and made it clear that they would not stand by and watch as their strategically important neighbor was transformed into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of the pro-Russian, democratically elected Ukrainian president was the straw that broke the camel’s back. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared might host a NATO naval base, and sought to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. Putin’s reaction should not have been surprising. After all, the West had pushed into Russia’s backyard and threatened its core.”
“The crisis in Ukraine shows that realpolitik remains relevant and that states that ignore it do so at their peril. U.S. and European leaders made a mistake in trying to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on the Russian border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misguided policy.”
“The first round of NATO enlargement took place in 1999 and involved the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The second took place in 2004 and included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. But the Russians were too weak at the time to curb the eastward movement of NATO, which, in any case, did not appear that threatening, since none of the new members bordered Russia, apart from the tiny Baltic countries. Then NATO began to look further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. Putin argued that the admission of these two countries to NATO would pose a “direct threat” to Russia. A Russian newspaper reported that Putin, speaking with Bush, “very transparently implied that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would cease to exist.””
“Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, deeply committed to getting his country into NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two separate regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided, and out of NATO. After fighting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point clear. However, despite this clear warning, NATO never abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And NATO expansion continued to march forward, with the accession of Albania and Croatia in 2009.”
“The latest tool available to the West to distance Kiev from Moscow has been efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often involves funding pro-Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States has invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” When Russian leaders look to Western social engineering in Ukraine, they fear that their country may be next. The West’s triple package of policies-NATO enlargement, EU expansion and democracy promotion-has fueled a fire.”
“Putin then exerted strong pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that he would destroy Ukraine as a functioning state before allowing it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep. To that end, he provided advisers, weapons and diplomatic support to Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Putin’s actions should be easy to understand. A huge expanse of flat land that Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany crossed to strike at Russia itself: Ukraine is a buffer state of enormous strategic importance to Russia.Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand its logic. Imagine Washington’s outrage if China were to build a high-impact military alliance and seek to include Canada and Mexico. U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react rather negatively and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I think it’s a tragic mistake. There was no reason to do this. No one was threatening anyone else.”
Foreign Affairs’ analysis is also prescient about an ‘eventual invasion of Ukraine. “About 15 million people-a third of Ukraine’s population-live between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Russian border. The vast majority want to stay in Ukraine and would oppose a Russian occupation. Moreover, the mediocre Russian army would have little chance of pacifying all of Ukraine. Even if Russia boasted a powerful military machine and an impressive economy, it would not be able to successfully occupy Ukraine. One only has to think of Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, American experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, and Russian experiences in Chechnya to remember that military occupations usually end badly. Putin is surely aware that trying to subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine.”
And so it will happen, eight years later. However, a solution to the Ukrainian crisis existed, according to Foreign Affairs. “The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to Westernize Ukraine and aim instead to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, similar to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should recognize that Ukraine is so important to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This does not mean that a future Ukrainian government should be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that does not fall within the sphere of either Russia or the West.”
“One also hears claims that Ukraine has the right to determine with whom it wants to ally and that the Russians do not have the right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. But abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states pick fights with weaker ones. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts of life and to act cautiously in relations with its more powerful neighbor.” Auto-translation of DeepL