By Jasim Al-Azzawi* – Middle East Monitor (MEMO)
In a scene unimaginable just months ago, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa strode into the White House this week, becoming the first Syrian leader to visit the United States. The arrival marked a stunning reversal of fortune for a man who, barely a year ago, led insurgent forces with a $10 million American bounty on his head. Now, he sits across from President Donald Trump not as a pariah, but as a potential partner in reshaping the Middle East’s fractured landscape.
Al-Sharaa’s transformation from jihadist commander to heaad of state represents one of the most dramatic political pivots in recent memory. Once known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, he spent years fighting US forces in Iraq and later led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an offshoot of al-Qaeda. He was imprisoned by American troops and designated a global terrorist in 2013. Yet in December 2024, his forces toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime in just eleven days, ending more than half a century of brutal authoritarian rule.
The great seduction
The pace of al-Sharaa’s rehabilitation has been breathtaking. Washington quietly removed his terrorist designation last year, and just days before his White House visit, the United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions against him and his interior minister. “This meeting symbolizses a complete reorientation,” said Lina Khatib, a Middle East analyst at Chatham House. “For years, the US sought to contain Syria. Now, the White House sees it as a partner — even an ally — in regional security.”
Trump has embraced the Syrian leader with characteristic enthusiasm, calling him “a tough guy in a tough neighbourhood” and praising his efforts to restore order. The administration waived sanctions under the Caesar Act and is now pushing Congress to permanently repeal them-a move that would open Syria to billions in reconstruction investment. With the World Bank estimating the cost of reconstruction at over $200 billion, the economic stakes could hardly be higher.
But the most consequential dimension of al-Sharaa’s Washington visit concerns not reconstruction but reconciliation—specifically, with Israel. Behind closed doors, American mediators have been orchestrating what would be an unprecedented security arrangement between Damascus and Tel Aviv, two capitals that have been in a technical state of war since 1948.
The Israeli-Syrian negotiations, now in what officials describe as “advanced stages,” focus on establishing joint security mechanisms along their shared border. Since Assad’s collapse, Israel has deployed troops into a demilitarised buffer zone in the Golan Heights, citing security concerns. Damascus wants those forces withdrawn; Israel demands demilitarisation of southwestern Syria and guarantees against Iranian influence. Reports say the United States is even preparing to establish a military presence at an airbase near Damascus to help enforce any agreement—a remarkable development given Trump’s stated preference for reducing American military commitments in the region.
Yet what Syria will not be discussing, at least initially, is full normalisation with Israel. Though the Trump administration seemed keen on bringing Syria into the Abraham Accords, al-Sharaa has called that prospect “unrealistic for now.” The sticking point, unsurprisingly, is the Golan Heights—the strategic plateau Israel captured from Syria in 1967 and formally annexed in 1981, a move recognised only by the United States.
The Golan Heights in exchange for legitimacy?
Here, matters become murky and disputed. Various reports indicate that Syria does not insist on the Golan’s return in the current negotiations but limits its demands to an Israeli withdrawal from the recently occupied buffer zones. According to other reports, Damascus insists that at least one-third of the Golan should be returned to it as a precondition for peace. At the same time, some have advanced complicated schemes involving staged withdrawals and leasing arrangements. On the other hand, the Israeli officials have declared unmistakably that no agreement whatsoever can be reached without the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan.
The ambiguity could be deliberate. Al-Sharaa must walk a precarious tightrope: winning sufficient concessions to retain credibility with an exhausted Syrian public after fourteen years of civil war, without giving the impression that he is selling out Syria’s territorial claims forever. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, al-Sharaa’s foremost international patron, is said to be opposed to full normalisation with Israel on grounds that would undermine Ankara’s influence at the expense of Israeli and Saudi leverage.
The Syrian street is intensely skeptical. Social media in Damascus and Aleppo has exploded in accusations of betrayal, with critics charging that al-Sharaa is trading Syrian land for international legitimacy. Even within Syria’s security apparatus, there are reports of disquiet about potential concessions. The legacy of Assad’s iron-fisted refusal to compromise in any way with Israel remains fresh, and al-Sharaa will have to navigate the gap between pragmatic diplomacy and the nationalist mood.
Complicating matters further is the question of al-Sharaa’s commitment to inclusive governance and minority rights. Despite declarations of national unity, state security forces have been implicated in violence against Alawite and Druze minorities, with several hundred killed. Jihadist formations remain embedded in Syria’s military structure. The Trump administration’s willingness to overlook these problematic developments in its drive for strategic dividends has drawn criticism from human rights advocates and regional analysts alike.
Netanyahu’s plan to reshape the ME
For the US and Israel, the calculus is clear: a West-aligned Syria is a devastating blow to Iran and its “axis of resistance.” If Damascus cuts ties with Tehran and Hezbollah, then the regional balance of power dramatically shifts in favour of Washington’s Gulf allies and Tel Aviv. Netanyahu has made this very clear; it was the weakening of Iran and Hezbollah, he said, that made these negotiations “possible.”
But critics caution that overnight rehabilitation of a warlord carries enormous risks. Former Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael Herzog also doubted whether the framework from the 1974 disengagement—which al-Sharaa has cited as a potential model—still applies. “That is outdated,” Herzog said, adding that active American involvement is necessary in any new configuration. The question is whether al-Sharaa has the political capital to make good on what is being promised in his name. He presides over a divided country, commands security forces of dubious loyalty, and is opposed by Turkish-backed factions within his own coalition. His history as a jihadist commander arguably gave him the credibility to overthrow Assad, but statecraft demands different skills than insurgency.
The jihadist’s grand gambit
Al-Sharaa’s White House visit represents a high-stakes gamble-and one shared all around. Trump and Netanyahu are wagering that they can turn a former terrorist into a reliable partner through a mixture of economic carrots and diplomatic acknowledgment. The newly minted Syrian President is gambling that he can gain international legitimacy and reconstruction aid without irretrievably alienating his domestic base or sacrificing Syria’s long-term territorial claims. He may think he’s pursuing the pragmatic course for a war-shattered nation, but pragmatism looks like capitulation to a population that has sacrificed so much.
The coming months will reveal whether this improbable statesman can thread the needle—achieving recognition without subordination, reconstruction without surrender, and legitimacy without betrayal. For now, Ahmed al-Sharaa stands at the center of a grand diplomatic experiment, one that could either stabilise a volatile region or ignite new conflicts in a land that has already endured too much suffering.
*Jasim Al-Azzawi worked for several media organisations, including MBC, Abu Dhabi TV, and Aljazeera English as a news anchor, program presenter, and Executive Producer. He covered significant conflicts, interviewed world leaders, and taught media courses.