By Uroš Lipušcek* – Consortium News
In this crisis of confidence, Uroš Lipušcek says Europeans can either seek autonomy and peace with Russia or follow the current E.U. course of increasing authoritarianism and geopolitical insignificance.
Europe today finds itself at a historical crossroads reminiscent of 1848 and the period between 1933 and 1939. The European revolutions of 1848, also known as the Springtime of Nations, and the events leading up to 1939 share several important historical processes with the present day.
Both periods were characterised by a crisis of political representation, social divisions, economic uncertainty, growing dissatisfaction among the middle and lower classes, militarisation and questions about the legitimacy of existing political institutions.
Of course, the historical circumstances are not identical. In 1848, European nations revolted primarily against absolute monarchies, the remnants of feudalism and political subordination.
During the period preceding the Second World War, Europe faced racist, fascist and Nazi ideologies seeking to establish domination over Europe and subsequently the world.
Today’s European protests are taking place within formally democratic states, where the sources of discontent are linked to economic inequality, the cost of living, migration, distrust of political elites, the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the future of European integration and rivalry between major powers over the redistribution of geopolitical spheres of influence.
Underlying these developments is the determination of leading American elites to preserve their global supremacy, even where the interests of American hegemony increasingly conflict with the long-term economic and security interests of European countries.
In October, protests that began in France spread to Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Albania — and now Germany. A wave of discontent is also becoming increasingly visible in what is known as the New Europe, comprising the former socialist countries.
In Serbia, student protests lasting almost two years led to the end of the 14-year rule of President Aleksandar Vucic, while Poland has experienced a serious constitutional crisis in recent days.
Old & New Europe
The unrest in both Old and New Europe has some common roots, although there are also significant differences. Major social transformations often do not begin with grand political programmes, but with unexpected incidents that expose the gap between a country’s official image and the everyday reality of its citizens.
Examples include rats roaming poorly maintained French primary schools; the kicking of a hungry horse in the royal stables in Paris, which, according to some historical accounts, triggered a wave of discontent that eventually contributed to the French bourgeois revolution of 1789; rotten meat aboard the Russian battleship Potemkin in 1905, which sparked the first Russian Revolution; the self-immolation of a fruit seller in Tunisia in 2010; an eviction this September that sparked the widespread housing protests in Spain; current poor food in a student canteen in Pristina in 1981, which became the catalyst for a general uprising among the population of Kosovo; and the deaths of 16 people in Novi Sad in 2024 following the collapse of a railway station canopy, an event that ultimately led to a change of government in Serbia.
These very different incidents confirm that seemingly isolated events can trigger major social transformations. They all raise the same fundamental question: when, and at what point, do people irrevocably lose confidence that the state and its political elites are still acting in their interests?
The Crisis of the European Political Model
The unrest, protests and growing social discontent that have shaken Western Europe in recent years are not merely the consequences of individual political decisions, economic difficulties or dissatisfaction with incumbent governments.
They reflect a much deeper phenomenon: the gradual exhaustion of the post-war European social model, growing contradictions between the interests of political and economic elites and the expectations of the population, and, above all, a loss of confidence in the institutions of liberal, parliamentary democracy.
France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and other Western European countries are experiencing various forms of discontent. In France, the main issues are social conflicts, pension reform, the cost of living and distrust of the political establishment.
In Germany, protests by workers and farmers, dissatisfaction with economic stagnation and deindustrialisation, failed energy policies and the consequences of the war in Ukraine have become important factors. Students are also protesting increasing militarisation and a proposed military draft.
In other countries, protests over the cost of living are accompanied by growing dissatisfaction with the housing crisis, migration, insecure employment and the widespread perception that political institutions no longer represent the interests of ordinary people.
The essence of today’s unrest therefore cannot be understood if we treat these developments merely as individual protests against specific government measures. Underlying them is a broader crisis of confidence in Europe’s political, economic and social system.
Economic Insecurity & the Erosion of Social Protection
One of the fundamental causes of discontent is the gradual deterioration in the living standards of a significant proportion of Europe’s population. For decades, European societies were based on an implicit social contract: economic growth, the welfare state and relatively stable employment would enable each new generation to enjoy a better life than the previous one. Today, that social contract has become increasingly difficult to sustain.
According to a 2025 Eurofound survey, as many as 61 percent of respondents from low-income households struggled to make ends meet from one month to the next. This illustrates the extent of social stratification and the unequal distribution of the consequences of economic crises.
The situation of young people is particularly worrying. For many of them, owning a home, securing stable employment and achieving social security are becoming increasingly unattainable goals. Growing numbers of young people feel that they will have a worse standard of living than their parents. This is not merely a material problem; it is also a question of lost prospects and declining confidence in the future.
The Militarization of Europe & the Question of Priorities
Another significant negative factor is the changing hierarchy of Europe’s political and economic priorities. The war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on European security policy, energy flows, economic relations with Russia and public finances more generally. European countries are increasing military expenditure while cutting social spending amid resultant budgetary constraints, high public debt and growing pressure to restore and increase social services.
The pressing question concerns society’s priorities: how much should be spent on armaments, and how much on the welfare state, healthcare, education, housing and infrastructure?
For many citizens, the contradiction is obvious: governments speak of the necessity of massive increases in defence spending while, at the same time, cutting expenditure on education, healthcare, pensions and other public services.
European political elites apparently find it easier to reach agreement on increasing military budgets than on resolving the everyday social problems facing their populations. European security, however, is not simply a question of military strength. It is also a question of social stability, economic sustainability and citizens’ confidence in the future.
The Crisis of Political Representation & Democratic Legitimacy
Another important political cause of the unrest is growing distrust of traditional political parties and institutions.
A large part of the population feels that key decisions are being made beyond democratic scrutiny. Voters may change their governments through elections, but they find it much more difficult to influence decision-making.
European democracy, and the European Union in particular, faces a serious question: do its institutions still adequately represent the interests of different social groups, or has the gap between political decision-making and the everyday lives of ordinary people become too wide?
Migration, Cultural Tensions & a Sense of Lost Identity
Migration and the social tensions associated with it are another important factor in the current crisis. In Western European countries, questions of immigration, integration, security, cultural identity and access to public services are becoming increasingly intertwined with the broader economic discontent.
Migration in itself does not explain today’s unrest. However, when people face housing shortages, overcrowded schools, long waiting lists for healthcare and uncertainty in the labour market, migration policy becomes an important symbol — if not a scapegoat — of the broader dissatisfaction with the way the state functions. At a deeper level, it raises the question of whether European countries are capable of ensuring successful integration, social cohesion and equal rights for all their inhabitants.
Geopolitical Crisis & Loss of Strategic Autonomy
At the end of the Cold War, Europe enjoyed the status of an economically powerful, politically influential and secure part of the world.
Global power relations, however, have changed.
European economies have begun to fall behind, while the United States is seeking to preserve its global hegemony, increasingly at Europe’s expense.
China is emerging as a first-rate economic and technological power, BRICS countries are strengthening their cooperation and American foreign policy is placing ever greater emphasis on its own national interests.
The European Union has found itself in crisis. Its economic competitiveness and technological innovation are under increasing pressure. Relations with Russia have been severed as a result of the war in Ukraine and Brussels’ refusal to establish a political dialogue with Moscow, while Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States in the field of security remains substantial.
The prolonged confrontation with Moscow has economic, energy and security consequences that European citizens feel both directly and indirectly in the abscence of a new security architecture, one that is not based on the permanent division of the continent into opposing blocs, but on the gradual establishment of security cooperation with Russia.
Growing Inequality Within EU Countries
Income and wealth inequalities within the European Union have increased in recent years. This is also reflected in the so-called Gini coefficient, named after the renowned Italian economist Corrado Gini.
The Gini coefficient is a statistical indicator measuring inequality in the distribution of income or wealth among the inhabitants of a particular country.
Social and wealth inequality are important factors contributing to the growing tensions. The most developed European countries currently experiencing protests rank in the upper third of this inequality scale. Essentially, this is a question of redistributing the wealth generated by society, an issue that governing elites committed to neoliberal economic models refuse to acknowledge.
France is a typical example of class-based exploitation. The renowned French economist Thomas Piketty observes that France has never been as wealthy as it is today. The problem is not a lack of national wealth, but how that wealth is distributed.
Piketty points to a fundamental contradiction: the French state invokes high public debt (115 percent of GDP) and a shortage of financial resources, while private wealth has risen to approximately six times the country’s GDP, compared with three times GDP in 1970. He therefore argues that the state should raise more revenue by taxing the largest private fortunes rather than reducing public services.
Viva la France!
As a member of the eurozone, France does not have independent control over interest rates and cannot devalue its currency. Fiscal policy is therefore its principal instrument of economic adjustment.
Before the introduction of the euro, France, Italy and other Mediterranean countries were known for their relatively weak currency and frequent devaluations. Reducing the deficit consequently requires either higher revenues, lower expenditure, or a combination of both. In France, each of these options generates political conflict.
Pension expenditure is particularly politically sensitive because the system is closely linked to the statutory retirement age. The 2023 reform, which raised the statutory retirement age from 62 to 64, was justified as a necessary condition for the long-term sustainability of the system. It nevertheless became one of the most controversial government measures.
Another contributing factor is that military spending is increasing significantly faster than spending on education.
Next year, the French government plans to allocate €63.4 billion to the military, including military pensions, compared with €57 billion this year. This means France’s defence budget will have doubled over the course of President Emmanuel Macron’s two, five-year terms in office.
The Ministry of Defence is one of the few ministries that will receive a budget increase in 2027. Total military expenditure by E.U. member states amounted to approximately €418 billion last year, with France accounting for around 15 percent of that.
On the other hand, funding for the public education is a central source of domestic political tension amid increasingly serious protests. The Ministry of Education’s budget for next year is expected to amount to €89.1 billion.
However, €28.5 billion of this will go towards state pension payments for teachers rather than the operation of classrooms, equipment or the salaries of currently employed teachers. In an effort to calm the protesters, the government has cancelled its planned dismissal of secondary-school teachers and promised to create 500 new teaching positions.
It has also announced €4 billion in subsidised-interest loans to local authorities to renovate school buildings.
The only available reserve would be to reduce military expenditure. However, French President Emmanuel Macron, along with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, is a principal E.U. leader advocating the continuation of the Ukraine war and escalation with Russia.
The French left, if it can still be described as a unified political force, remains deeply divided. It is no coincidence that former President François Hollande, who steered the Socialist Party into the neoliberal centre of the political spectrum, appointed former Rothschild banker Macron as his successor.
Nothing other than the defence of the neoliberal model could have been expected from Macron. His principal legacy, when his presidential term expires next May, will be growing wealth inequality and the militarisation of the French state.
France, however, has always been at the forefront of rebellion in modern history.
Macron has apparently forgotten the remark made by the Duke de La Rochefoucauld to King Louis XVI after the fall of the Bastille: It is not a revolt, Sire, it is a revolution.
This is probably the most famous statement associated with the French Revolution, and it should serve as a warning to today’s republican rulers as well.
As Macron’s conduct also demonstrates, governments frequently misunderstand social unrest because they judge it by its immediate triggers rather than by the depth of the underlying social contradictions.
In the face of the current unrest spreading across Europe, the question arises: are we witnessing merely a repetition of the revolt of 1968, or the beginnings of more profound transformations?
Are we seeing nothing more than a crisis of individual governments, or a broader crisis of legitimacy affecting the post-war European political, economic and security order, which far-right and nationalist parties may exploit to their advantage?
There is no answer to this question yet. Louis XVI failed to understand it. Will Macron, Merz and other European leaders do any better?
*Slovenian journalist and historian who was the long-time correspondent for RTV Slovenija from the U.N., U.S. and China. He was a candidate for the E.U. parliament in 2024. At present he is a professor at Emuni University (Euro-Mediterranean University) in Piran, Slovenia. He is the author of several books and analyses on history, among them Ave Wilson: USA and the Remaking of Slovenia in Versailles 1919–1920, (2003) and Sacro Egoismo: Slovenians in the Clutches of the Secret London Pact of 1915 (2012).