by Michelle Gavin – Council on Foreign RelationsThe provincial and national elections on May 29 come amid
waning support for the ruling African National Congress thirty years after
South Africa transitioned to democracy. In recent years, South Africa has struggled with sluggish
economic growth, widespread unemployment, unreliable access to power,
dysfunctional rail and port infrastructure, crime, and corruption. Polling
indicates that more than 80 percent [PDF] of South Africans believe the country
is going in the wrong direction. The African National Congress (ANC) party has dominated
government since the 1994 end of apartheid, the system of institutionalized
racial segregation that disenfranchised the country’s non-white majority. Since
then, the most significant political contests in South Africa have been those
internal to the ANC. But the party’s dominance is now waning as citizens grow
increasingly dissatisfied with their government, and numerous high-profile
scandals have tarnished the images of many ANC leaders. Polls suggest that the ANC could lose its outright majority
for the first time, which would force it into a coalition to govern the
country, although that is not a foregone conclusion. Still, that prospect is
prompting significant anxiety throughout the country, as some of South Africa’s
recent experiences with coalition governments at the municipal level have been
disastrous. The health of South African democracy is also at stake.
While the country boasts an impressive civil society, free press, and
independent judiciary, political violence remains stubbornly persistent. These
elections will almost certainly be free and fair—South Africa boasts highly
credible electoral institutions—but Afrobarometer polling shows that 70 percent
of South Africans are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their
country. Furthermore, a majority of South Africans are dissatisfied with
democracy and say they would give up their ability to elect leaders if they
could be assured of security, jobs, and better service delivery from the
government. Whether South Africans choose to participate in elections will be
an important indicator to watch; low voter turnout could indicate
disenchantment with the political system.
Who is on the ballot?Dozens of political parties will contest the national elections
alongside the ANC. Additionally, independent candidates will be on the ballot
for the first time, adding new complexity to the electoral process. The party,
or coalition, that accounts for more than half of the four hundred–seat
National Assembly then chooses South Africa’s president. The most significant challenges to the ANC come from: the business-friendly Democratic Alliance (DA), with its
stronghold in the Western Cape Province; the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who advocate for
radical economic changes such as nationalizing industries; and the newly
formed uMkhonto WeSizwe (MK) Party, which hasserved as a vehicle for former President Jacob Zuma and his supporters.Once an ANC stalwart, Zuma was forced to resign the
presidency in 2018 after bombshell investigations into corruption under his
administration sapped confidence in his leadership. This new political project,
the MK Party, is animated by Zuma’s ongoing legal battles and animosity toward
current President Cyril Ramaphosa and the ANC factions that helped to oust
Zuma. It combines some of the radical economic policies of the EFF with a call
to scrap the constitution and invest more authority in traditional leaders. The
Constitutional Court has ruled that Zuma himself is ineligible to stand for
election to the National Assembly due to his prior criminal conviction.No party is likely to win an outright majority in the
National Assembly, though one or more could play a role in a coalition
government. Ramaphosa is likely to remain South Africa’s President, serving his
second, final term.What are the implications for South Africa’s relations with
governments in the region and beyond?South Africa will continue to play an important role in
Africa given the sheer size of its economy, although ongoing instances of
xenophobic violence—fueled by frustration with limited economic opportunity—could
continue to complicate South Africa’s claim to regional leadership. The
country’s willingness to deploy its forces to regional stability operations, as
it has recently done in northern Mozambique and the eastern Democratic Republic
of the Congo, is not likely to be significantly changed by the electoral
outcome.Should the elections result in an unstable coalition or a
governing direction antagonistic to the private sector, the country’s
aspirations to serve as a “gateway to Africa” for foreign investors will
suffer. Such an outcome would likely also turbocharge South African enthusiasm
for further expansion of the BRICS group led by Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa and push the country even closer to Russia and China, though South
African leaders will continue to characterize such developments as
“nonalignment.” Relations with the United States, meanwhile, have been
particularly rocky recently in light of policy differences relating to the wars
in Ukraine and Gaza Strip. South Africa-U.S. relations would worsen in such an
election scenario, with likely implications for South Africa’s duty-free access
to U.S. markets. Cooperation with the United States and Europe on the Just
Energy Transition Partnership would also likely stall. In contrast, an ANC coalition with the DA will likely result
in a policy course of nonalignment in name and in practice, as the DA has been
critical of some of South Africa’s more pro-Russia decisions. An outright ANC
victory will mean a continuation of the status quo, in which the disparate ANC
factions drive the government to continue robust economic engagement with
Western powers on one hand and to align reflexively with Russia, China, and
Iran against those powers on the other. Regardless of the electoral outcome, deep-seated elements of
South African foreign policy will persist, such as championing the rights of
Palestinians and calling for international institutions to reform to better
reflect the priorities of African states.