By Hilal Khashan* – Geopolitical Futures
Long before the Hamas attack, Israelis did not see a two-state solution as a viable option.
The idea of a two-state solution was a Palestinian concept that gradually gained international support. Its broad outlines began to take shape in the early 1970s after the Jordanian army expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan and forcibly relocated PLO headquarters to Lebanon. However, Israel has from the outset rejected Palestinian statehood, pointing to the fact that peace talks and U.N. resolutions never referred to establishing a Palestinian state. It has also argued that Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack created a sweeping sentiment within Israel, shared by young West Bank Palestinians but for different reasons, that Palestinian statehood will never be an acceptable option.
Israel’s Stance
Recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to a state casts doubt on the biblical Zionist narrative that defines the “Land of Israel” as stretching from the Mediterranean coast to the Jordan Rift Valley, which includes the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. Thus, Israel’s rejection of a Palestinian state in the West Bank is both a strategic and a principled position. Until a few years ago, Israel did not recognize the existence of the Palestinian people, and the flexibility it has sometimes shown on this front, including in the 2002 road map for peace and the 2020 Abraham Accords, was just a maneuver to buy time to annex more land.
Israel’s rejection of a Palestinian state is not a ploy to extract more concessions from the Palestinians. It’s also not, as Israel insists, a reaction to Palestinian attempts to acquire a state through violence or concerns that a Palestinian state will threaten Israel and the region. Israel does not view the Palestinians’ commitment to peace, their abandonment of armed struggle or international legitimacy of the Israeli state as incentives to grant the Palestinians an independent political entity.
To understand the Israeli position, it is essential to understand the real cause of the 1967 war, which resulted in Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, Gaza and the Sinai Desert. Israel knew that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser did not want war despite his rhetoric. He explained that Egypt itself would not start a war but would react massively should Israel launch one. The Egyptian military command considered sending forces to Sinai as a demonstration to persuade the administration of U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to engage in dialogue with Nasser after their estrangement in 1965. Egypt agreed to send Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin to Washington to discuss ways to ease tensions in the Middle East and reverse Egypt’s decision to close the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Ten days before Mohieddin’s scheduled visit, however, Israel launched the Six-Day War.
Soon after the war’s conclusion, Yigal Allon, an Israeli Cabinet member, proposed the annexation of the Jordan River lowland to isolate West Bank Palestinians from Transjordan and Israel’s ambitious settlement construction project. Israel wanted what it called the liberation of the Land of Israel, especially Judea and Samaria, fearing increasing demands from the Palestine Liberation Organization, established in 1964, and the Fatah movement to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank, which was then under Jordanian control, and the Gaza Strip, then administered by Egypt.
These calls for independence explain Jordanian King Hussein’s decision just five days before the outbreak of the war to sign a defense treaty with Egypt, as he was aware of Israel’s intention to go to war and the likely outcome of the conflict. He preferred to get rid of the West Bank, which he viewed as a burden on his Hashemite Kingdom. He withdrew his army from the territory without putting up much of a fight.
Israel did not occupy the West Bank or construct settlements and roads there solely for security reasons. It had no intention to return the area to the Palestinians so that they could establish a state if the region became more secure. Rather, its intention was for the West Bank to become part of the state of Israel. This was made clear by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s 1956 proclamation that Jordan had no right to exist and that the West Bank should become an autonomous region within Israel.
Statehood and Peace Talks
No direct or indirect negotiations with the Palestinians mentioned the potential for a Palestinian state in a realistic manner. Even talks on the Oslo Accords veered from the topic and treated the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as disputed lands. Israel and the United States have insisted that the peace process be based on U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which did not mention the word “Palestine” or the Palestinians but addressed instead the Arab countries that participated in the 1967 war.
Even after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994 following the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israel rejected Palestinian sovereignty over any land, water and space. It also objected to the name “Palestinian National Authority,” which implies the existence of a homeland and state. It instead insists on using “Palestinian Authority” to describe the entity that administers the Palestinian territories. Thus, the passports of residents of the West Bank and Gaza bear the name “Palestinian Authority.”
Israel accepted the idea of establishing a Palestinian state that includes the West Bank, or parts of it, on only two occasions but placed impossible conditions for its establishment in both instances. The first was the road map for peace. In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush referred in a speech to the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state. The “international quartet,” consisting of the U.S., the European Union, the United Nations and Russia, put forward a plan to get negotiations underway amid Israel’s continued construction of settlements in the West Bank. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon set 14 conditions for accepting the plan and establishing a Palestinian state that ultimately derailed its implementation. The conditions included an indefinite hold on negotiations with the Palestinians on resolving the final status issues and refusal to dismantle any settlements, including isolated outposts.
The second instance was the Abraham Accords, signed under mediation during the Trump administration. Although they cite the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented 10 conditions to make this happen that the Palestinians could not satisfy. They included Israel’s annexation of the Jordan Valley lowland, the northern West Bank and related settlements, Palestinian acceptance of Israel’s annexation of east Jerusalem, and the extension of Israeli security sovereignty over the entire West Bank. Netanyahu insisted that after the Palestinians accepted these conditions, negotiations would begin between the two parties to establish a Palestinian state.
Traumatized Israeli Public
A poll release last February and conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv found that 63 percent of Jewish Israelis opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state. Many are reluctant to discuss creation of a Palestinian state or even consider peace, even in the context of a comprehensive normalization agreement with all Arab countries. Hamas’ attack last year wounded the Israeli psyche, disillusioning Israelis about the possibility of peaceful coexistence with Palestinians.
The country is also experiencing a period of political upheaval and social division. Although most Israelis see Netanyahu as the politician best suited to lead the country, they also view him as a failed and corrupt leader. Only 28 percent of respondents in the INSS poll said they approved of Netanyahu, indicating Israel is suffering from a crisis of confidence in its political leaders. Many respondents also said they could agree to make peace without necessarily establishing a Palestinian state if a trusted and charismatic leader emerged.
Last July, the Knesset approved by a large majority a draft resolution rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River. The move came after five countries – Norway, Ireland, Spain, Slovenia and Armenia – recognized the Palestinian state. The Knesset vote was a clear message that Israel would not agree to establishing a Palestinian state or any negotiations that could lead in that direction. It reflected the general sentiment in Israeli society against a two-state solution.
Palestinian Youth
As for young Palestinians, many say they do not trust the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and reject the establishment of a Palestinian state, believing it will fail due to rampant corruption and discontiguity and could, in the best case, lead to establishment of Native American-style reservations. Palestinian youth describe the Ramallah government as authoritarian and self-serving. More than 30 years after the declaration of principles on the White House lawn and the start of peace negotiations, young people have lost hope for the future.
Israelis and Palestinians are both traumatized peoples. The fragmented political landscape for both groups has produced unpopular leaders and limited public support for genuine peace, turning the page, and moving on to new horizons.
*Hilal Khashan is a contributing analyst at Geopolitical Futures. He is a Professor of political science at the American University of Beirut and a respected author and analyst of Middle Eastern affairs. He is the author of six books, including Hizbullah: A Mission to Nowhere. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019.) He is currently writing a book titled Saudi Arabia: The Dilemma of Political Reform and the Illusion of Economic Development. He is also the author of more than 110 articles that appeared in journals such as Orbis, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, Third World Quarterly, Israel Affairs, Journal of Religion and Society, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, and The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.