Blundering Into Yet Another Middle East War

by Jim Lobe* and Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio – Lobelog
The Washington elite is waking up to the increasingly real possibility that the Trump administration may be moving the country into yet another Middle East war. And much more quickly than anyone had anticipated. And through sheer incompetence and incoherence rather than by design.

At the moment, attention is focused on the situation in eastern Syrian, the details of which are spelled out well in a growing number of accounts such as Mohamad Bazzi’s piece in the Atlantic as well as a recent action alert by the National Iranian American Council. In addition, the New Republic’s Jeet Heer Tuesday posted an excellent piece that quotes former key Obama policymakers (Colin Kahl and Ilan Goldenberg), as well as Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT), who have been well ahead of other national-security analysts on Twitter and elsewhere in warning about the gathering storm clouds.
Eastern Syria is indeed the focus of the moment, particularly after the events of just the past few days. On Sunday, a a U.S. fighter jet shot down a Syrian warplane in Syrian territory, and Iran launched a mid-range missile attack on an Islamic State (ISIS or IS) target in eastern Syria Sunday. Russia subsequently warned that it will target U.S.-led coalition aircraft flying in Syrian territory west of the Euphrates. Then, on Tuesday, an Iranian-made drone was shot down close to the border with Iraq and Jordan where the various rival proxy forces are all converging to fill the vacuum in anticipation of the IS collapse. No doubt the Pentagon is gaming out the various scenarios in which a wider war could soon break out, but it certainly sees Iran and its allies in the area as the main post-IS threat to Washington’s interests in and around Syria. See, for example, this little memo published Tuesday by a senior policy adviser to the U.S. Central Command and, remarkably, a visiting fellow at the staunchly pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy (hat tip to Barbara Slavin). Or this helpful new contribution by WINEP’s long-time counselor and “Israel’s lawyer,” Dennis Ross.
Although the fireworks in eastern Syrian have rightfully captured our immediate concern, they shouldn’t distract too much from the highly volatile situation in the Persian Gulf following both the stunning IS terrorist attack in Tehran on June 7—which senior Iranian officials blamed on Saudi Arabia—and the two-week-old crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain on the one hand and Qatar (backed by Turkey and Iran) on the other. Although Tehran justified Sunday’s unprecedented missile strike by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in eastern Syria as retaliation for the terrorist attacks, it was also widely interpreted as a shot across the bow of the most anti-Iranian GCC states to remind them of their own vulnerability if war breaks out either in the Gulf or elsewhere.
In this context, Monday’s announcement by Riyadh that its navy had seized an explosives-laden boat and three members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) allegedly planning to blow up a Saudi offshore oil drilling rig does not bode well. According to The New York Times, the incident actually occurred Friday when Iran’s state media reported that Saudi border guards fired on boats belonging to “simple fishermen,” killing one of the occupants. The Saudis reported some details of the incident over the weekend, but only on Monday did it come out with its new and far more sensational account.
That incident may of course be relegated to less than a footnote in the region’s history. But it nonetheless suggests that things are not moving in a favorable direction and that whatever behind-the-scenes attempts at defusing tensions—whether between Saudi Arabia and Iran or, for that matter, Qatar—are not bearing much fruit. Of course, charges by Bahrain and the Saudis that Iran is constantly shipping weapons and terrorists to Yemen and other Gulf Arab destinations are nothing new. But, in the current atmosphere, the risks of an incident escalating out of control seem higher than ever.
Moreover—and this is the main point of this post—the possibilities for catastrophic miscalculation are skyrocketing. It’s not just the proximity of rival armed forces in both eastern Syria and the Gulf. It’s also the lack of direct communication among key parties and the lack of clarity as to their actual policies. That applies in spades to what passes for the Trump “administration.”
The Blockade
Take, for example, the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, which came just two weeks after the president’s visit to Riyadh and which Trump not only applauded but initially appeared to claim credit for in his tweets. Clearly, the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the Bahrainis had come to believe that Trump—even if he had not explicitly greenlighted such a drastic action during or after Riyadh summit—would support them against Doha. How shocked they must have been when the Pentagon and the State Department immediately voiced their reservations (not to say, their opposition)! Almost as shocked as Secretaries Mattis and Tillerson and National Security Adviser McMaster must have been when they first heard about Trump’s tweets. Here’s what the State Department spokesperson—to the extent you believe she speaks for the “administration”—said about Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s action Tuesday:
Now that it has been more than two weeks since the embargo started, we are mystified that the Gulf States have not released to the public, nor to the Qataris, the details about the claims that they are making toward Qatar. The more that time goes by the more doubt is raised about the actions taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
At this point we are left with one simple question: were the actions really about their concerns regarding Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism or were they about the long, simmering grievances between and among the GCC countries?
(Oh, snap.)
Assuming the State Department really speaks for the US government, this rather stunning statement begs a host of rather critical questions. How exactly did the Saudis and their allies come to think that Washington would support them? Who exactly gave them that impression and under what circumstances? Or are Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and UAE Crown Prince (and apparent MbS mentor) Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan (MbZ) so deluded or hubristic that they just assumed that Washington, including the Pentagon, was on board with this? And, if so, how prone to miscalculation are they in this moment of sky-high regional tensions?
After all, MbS has risen in influence in Saudi Arabia largely because of his pet foreign policy project, the war in Yemen, which, according to the latest reports, hasn’t been going particularly well (unless his original idea was to completely destroy the Arab world’s poorest country). He now finds himself in a very difficult spot.
Moreover, the Saudi king just elevated the hyper-ambitious MbS to crown prince overnight, placing him next in line in the royal succession. Like Trump, the 31-year-old is falling upward more through sheer audacity than palpable successes. Unless in his new exalted position he can somehow still impose his will on Qatar—an increasingly doubtful prospect in the absence of U.S. and Western diplomatic support – MbS looks ever more like a two-time loser (in Trumpspeak), and an extremely reckless one at that. And that perception makes him even more dangerous under the circumstances.
Meanwhile in Iran
How is all this perceived in Tehran, where various competing factions may also be prone to miscalculation? What do they think U.S. policy is? They know the Trump “administration” is united in its conviction that the Islamic Republic is irredeemably hostile to the U.S., but they also know there are degrees of difference among senior officials. Some White House officials reportedly favor “regime change” via covert action, and it was just a few days before the IS attack in Iran that it was disclosed that the CIA had picked Michael D’Andrea (aka The Dark Prince or Ayatollah Mike), a particularly aggressive covert operator, to run the agency’s Iran program.
Tehran was also deeply offended by Trump’s shocking reaction to the June 7 terrorist attack and further taken aback by Tillerson’s statement of support for a “peaceful transition” of government in Iran one week later. These statements no doubt served to strengthen hardliners in Tehran who already believe the worst about U.S. intentions as well as those of its regional allies. At the same time, Tehran knows that top officials—notably Mattis (who appears to have been granted virtually unprecedented discretion in military decision-making) and McMaster—are keenly aware of the risks of getting dragged into a war with Iran (or becoming bogged down in Syria) even as they believe Washington should “push back” against Tehran’s “malign” behavior in the region.
And then there’s the commander-in-chief’s own impulsiveness, ignorance, and macho pose. At a moment of crisis a half a world away, Trump may actually welcome some serious fireworks as a useful diversion from his deepening political and legal problems at home. After all, those missiles strikes in Syria back in April gave him something of a reprieve, at least for a few days.
Given the latest head-spinning twist in Washington’s reaction to the KSA/UAE-led Qatar quarantine, it seems quite reasonable to ask how key Iranian policymakers will know who’s running policy in the White House when it’s faced with an incident that escalates quickly, and the Saudis, Emiratis, and Sheldon Adelson are on the phone insisting that Trump’s manhood is on the line? The likelihood of miscalculation by one or more of the major players is virtually certain.
It’s a very scary—but increasingly imaginable—prospect. 6/21/2017
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* Jim Lobe is an American journalist, graduated magna cum laude from Williams College in Williamstown (Massachusetts). He received his Juris Doctor from Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley in 1974. Jim served for some 30 years as the Washington DC bureau chief for Inter Press Service and is best known for his coverage of U.S. foreign policy and the influence of the neoconservative movement.
 
Annex:
Is the Saudi Prince Up to His New Job?
by Thomas W. Lippman* – Lobelog
The audacious young prince of Saudi Arabia known as MbS owns it all now, for better or worse. As a wisecracking American might say, “Good luck with that.”
With his elevation Wednesday to be crown prince, heir to the throne, and first deputy premier reporting only to his father the king, Prince Mohammed bin Salman will exercise nearly complete control over his country’s future. He was already minister of defense and chairman of the committee that sets the kingdom’s economic policy. His only rival for power, his older cousin Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN), was dismissed as crown prince and removed from his position as interior minister, a post in which his own father served before him. MbN was widely admired in the kingdom and respected in Washington for his largely successful efforts to suppress al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, but he is now out of the government at the age of 56.
The official announcement of the long-expected shakeup said that 31 of the 34 princes who comprise the family council on succession voted in favor. It did not name the three dissenters, but it has been clear for some time that the ambitions of Mohammed bin Salman have rankled some members of the family, who have watched uneasily as power was increasingly concentrated in one branch of the ruling family.
Now MbS, 31, has what he has clearly wanted since he was appointed deputy crown prince and defense minister two years ago. His father, King Salman, 81, has steadily increased his favorite son’s authority and responsibilities as MbN was eased into the background. King Salman still has all legal authority, but with the latest promotion of his son he has become a virtual figurehead. The only power center in Riyadh that does not report to the new crown prince is the National Guard, the principal domestic security force, which is commanded by another cousin, Prince Miteb bin Abdullah, a son of the late King Abdullah. Miteb’s opinion of the latest development is unknown and likely to remain so; he has no record of speaking out on royal family affairs.
Shouldering Many Burdens
MbS has an unobstructed path to the throne and because of his youth is in a position to run Saudi Arabia for decades. But with his power comes the responsibility for managing the kingdom’s affairs at a troubled time. The economic, social, and security challenges facing Saudi Arabia would be daunting for any executive who had long experience and was willing to delegate authority to competent and trusted subordinates. Neither characteristic applies to MbS. He is widely regarded as energetic and creative, but too many things are happening at once for anyone to be on top of all of them.
Internationally, MbS remains responsible for the stalemated war in Yemen, into which he led the kingdom more than two years ago. Saudi military forces and allies from the United Arab Emirates have been battling Yemeni rebels known as Houthis, whom the Saudis see as agents of their arch-rival, Iran. The war has caused widespread devastation in what was already the poorest country in the Arab world, killed thousands of civilians, and exposed large numbers of people to disease and starvation. No end is in sight as neither side has gained a decisive advantage, and meanwhile the Saudis are spending millions of dollars on the war at a time when they are short of money because of the long slump in oil prices.
Saudi Arabia has also provoked an absurd conflict with Qatar. The Saudis imposed a boycott on its next-door neighbor, along with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and other countries, based on accusations that the Qataris support extremist groups and are insufficiently hostile to Iran. The boycott has disrupted lives and businesses all across the Arab side of the Gulf—on Wednesday the Saudis reportedly expelled thousands of Qatari-owned camels who crossed the border to graze—just a few weeks after Qatar joined all the others in apparent harmony at President Trump’s anti-terrorism summit in Riyadh.
Trump tweeted his support for the Saudis when the boycott was imposed, but Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has sought to bridge the differences between the Qataris and the others, and has made no secret of his annoyance at Saudi Arabia for a move that undermines longstanding U.S. policy in the region. Qatar is an important military partner of the United States, home to the largest U.S. military base in the region as well as the forward headquarters for the U.S. Central Command. In Washington, relations with the United States are now being managed by MbS’s even younger brother, Prince Khaled bin Salman, a former fighter pilot with no diplomatic experience who became ambassador in April.
As defense minister, MbS also has the tasks of managing the region-wide effort to stave off Iranian influence and of finding an acceptable solution to the intractable conflict in Syria, where Saudi Arabia is committed to the ouster of President Bashar al-Asaad.
Managing the government as deputy prime minister—the king remains nominal prime minister—MbS also assumes the domestic challenge of limiting recruitment by the Islamic State, which Interior Ministry officials have said is making inroads among the millions of non-Saudi Muslims living in the kingdom as contract workers. Many of them have lost their jobs because of the economic slump brought on by the decline in oil prices; living in the kingdom without their families, they are ripe for recruitment by extremist groups. Until Wednesday, that security task was the responsibility of the experienced, trusted Mohammed bin Nayef. Now it is the job of another young and little known price, Abdulaziz bin Saud bin Nayef. King Salman also removed MbN’s deputy, Abdulrahman bin Ali Al-Rubaian, from office.
Domestically, the kingdom faces all the same issues that have plagued it for years: over-dependence on oil revenue, a bloated government employment sector, reliance on foreign labor, a struggling education system that largely fails to prepare young Saudis for the modern job market, and social restrictions on women that inhibit economic development. In the past the kingdom could surmount those problems by throwing money at them, but the money has dwindled as the price of oil has dropped from more than $100 per barrel to about $45.
Vision 2030
MbS has taken on the task of re-structuring the economy through an ambitious plan known as Vision 2030, which calls for reducing government spending, cutting subsidies, diversifying the economy, and building up the private sector. A key component of the plan calls for selling a small portion of Saudi Aramco, the state oil company, and investing the proceeds for future development. If successful, which remains uncertain, it would be the largest initial public stock offering in history,
The jury is still out on this program. A “report card” on vision 2030 issued recently by the Arabia Foundation in Washington said, “In a short period of time, the Vision has meaningfully transformed the economy of Saudi Arabia, hastening the customary glacial pace of government decision-making that the Kingdom had become accustomed to. However, as is to be expected with a massive reform program, preliminary mistakes were made,” a reference to cuts in salaries and bonuses that caused widespread disgruntlement and were later rescinded. “Although eventually rectified, these mistakes impeded the pace of progress and dented public sentiment,”the report card said.
Among the flurry of royal decrees published Wednesday by the official Saudi Press Agency, one that drew little immediate attention could have the greatest long-term implications for royal rule. It amended the law of succession to stipulate that, although the throne will always pass to a direct male descendant of the founding king, Abdul Aziz, “after the sons of the founder King shall not be a King and a Crown prince of one branch of the offspring of the founder King.”That indicates that after the deaths of King Salman and the few remaining brothers of his generation, future kings—including Mohammed bin Salman—will not be able to appoint crown princes from their own branch of the family, as Salman just did. That could placate whatever princes of the other branches who may be resentful of the latest concentration of power by Salman and his sons.
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*Thomas W. Lippman is a Washington-based author and journalist who has written about Middle Eastern affairs and American foreign policy for more than four decades, specializing in Saudi Arabian affairs, U.S.- Saudi relations, and relations between the West and Islam. He is a former Middle East bureau chief of the Washington Post, and also served as that newspaper’s oil and energy reporter.