Masahiro Tauchi, Advisor, DEVNET JAPAN Former Ambassador of Japan to Norway
1. Tough and complex security environment
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February last year demonstrated that Russia is willing to resort to military force and invade other countries in order to achieve its own security objectives. In the process, President Vladimir Putin repeatedly made statements and actions that could be interpreted as threats with nuclear weapons. Russia has intensified its military activities in the vicinity of our country and strengthened its military forces in the Northern Territories, which is our own territory. Russia has strengthened its strategic ties with China, and in recent years, in particular, it has strengthened its military ties by continuously conducting joint exercises and drills, such as joint navigation by Chinese and Russian naval vessels and joint flights by bombers in the vicinity of Japan. Russia’s military activities shake the very foundations of the international order and are perceived as the most serious and direct threat in Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan. Russia’s military movements and external activities, combined with its strategic partnership with China, are of strong security concern.
China is promoting unilateral changes to the status quo by force in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Chinese vessels are regularly trespassing in the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture. With regard to Taiwan, China has not denied the possibility of the use of force, while maintaining its policy of peaceful unification. Furthermore, China has been increasing its military activities in the airspace around Taiwan, including the launch of ballistic missiles into the waters around Japan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific but also in the international community as a whole.
North Korea has launched ballistic missiles at an unprecedentedly high frequency, with a record number of 37 launches last year. It is rapidly building up its military capabilities. In particular, the launch of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-class missiles with a range that includes the US mainland, the launch of missiles in new forms including missiles flying in variable trajectories, and the launch from various platforms such as vehicles with launch pads, submarines and trains have resulted in rapid progress in missile-related technologies and operational capabilities, and pose an even more serious and imminent threat to our country’s security. This has become an even more serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused a strong sense of crisis among neighboring non-NATO member states that even countries applying for NATO membership (e.g.,Ukraine and Georgia) would not receive support ofNATO’s military intervention against Russia’s aggression unless they became official members. Finland and Sweden, which had long followed a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, also changed their defense policy and applied for NATO membership. Although NATO supports Ukraine, which is exercising its right to self-defense under the UN Charter, by providing it with weapons, the quality and quantity of the weapons it provides are limited in order not to overstimulate Russia. Even though Ukrainian President Zelensky has always requested the provision of powerful, state-of-the-art weapons, these have not been provided as he has wished. Thus, the war between Russia and Ukraine has been protracted and Ukraine has suffered enormous damage. But NATO says, it is up to Ukraine to decide whether to continue fighting or not, and it is in a difficult situation where an independent state will disappear if it does not continue fighting.
In the UN Security Council, which is supposed to be in charge of ‘international peace and security’, it is clear that the Council is dysfunctional, as evidenced by the rejection in February 2022 of a draft resolution calling on Russia to immediately withdraw its troops from Ukraine, by Russia’s own veto, and the subsequent rejection of a draft resolution strengthening sanctions against North Korea, which repeatedly fired ballistic missiles, by China and Russia’s veto.
Every country must therefore take its own measures for self-defense, but the time has come when no single country can protect its own security. As challenges to the post-war international order continue, it is essential for Japan to deepen cooperation and partnership with allies and comrades who share universal values and strategic interests. By doing so, it has to fulfil the purpose of protecting the existence of our country and its people, and play an appropriate role in peace-building.
2.Japan’s Cabinet has decided to acquire the capabilities to strike enemy bases.
(1) Cabinet decision on the three defense documents.
On 16 December 2022, the Government of Japan adopted three new defense documents by Cabinet decision: the National Security Strategy, which is the basic policy for Japan’s foreign and defense policy; the National Defense Strategy, which is the policy for defense actions to be adopted by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces; and the Defense Force Development Plan, which indicates the level of defense capabilities that the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces should possess.
With the Cabinet decision, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities. Key features are as follows:
①Japan will possess counterstrike capabilities, which it has not had in its post-war defense policy, and continue to procure long-range missiles such as the US-made Tomahawk.
②The defense budget will break the quota of 1% of GDP that has been the guideline of successive cabinets and double the defense-related budget to 2% of GDP in FY2027; the amount of expenditure for the level of defense force development required to implement the Plan over the five-year period from FY2023 to FY2027 will amount to approximately \43 trillion.
③The recognition of China had previously been described as ‘a concern of the international community’, but the expression was strengthened by specifying that China’s move was ‘the greatest strategic challenge’ to the international order.
④The policy will move away from the ‘basic defense force concept’, which does not face the threat directly, and change to a policy of procuring the necessary ammunition and components to ensure and maintain a continuous warfighting capabilities.
⑤‘Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers’, which set out the conditions for exporting defense equipment, are to be revised. The transfer of defense equipment is to be promoted with a view to expanding the range of items and the countries to which they are exported.
(2) Possession of counterstrike capabilities
Possession of counterstrike capabilities is a pillar of the revision of the three documents. Japan has the right of self-defense under the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of Japan, and this right to self-defense is not renounced in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. The retention of the capabilities required for such self-defense action is also not denied under the Constitution of Japan as well as under international law.
Counterstrike capabilities are Self-Defense Forces’ capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force (see below). This ability to counterstrike is exercised only when the new three requirements for use of force are met as the minimum necessary measure of self-defense to protect the existence of the State and its citizens, and therefore does not change the concept of exclusive defense and is within the scope of international law and of the Constitution of Japan. A preemptive attack, in which a country attacks first when an armed attack from the opponent has not yet occurred, is not permitted.
By having the capabilities to launch such effective counterstrike, armed attacks themselves are deterred. In addition, in the event of a missile being launched by an opponent, the missile defense network will prevent incoming missiles, while the counterstrike capabilities will prevent further armed attacks from the opponent, thereby protecting the lives of the people and peaceful living.
In order to deter an armed attack by an opponent, itmust have “enough capabilities to make the opponent realize that an armed attack is not worth the cost of the damage that would result from a counterstrike”.
(3) Exercising the ability to counterstrike is within the scope of self-defense.
As for the counterstrike capabilities, in the reply to the Diet by Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama (read by the Director-General of the Defense Agency, Naka Funada) in 1956, it was stated that
“In the event of an imminent and unjust infringement against our country and, as a means of that infringement, an attack by guided missiles and the like against our land is done, I think it is inconceivable that the purpose of the Constitution is that we should sit back and wait for self-destruction. In such a case, it is legally within the scope of self-defense to take the minimum necessary measures to prevent such an attack, such as striking the base of guided missiles, as long as it is recognized that no other means are available to defend against an attack by a guided missile.”
The Government of Japan stated in the past that having counterstrike capabilities was within the scope of self-defense in legal terms, but it had not been a policy decision to possess counterstrike capabilities by saying that “at present, Japan does not possess any equipment system for the purpose of attacking enemy bases and … does not envisage attacking enemy bases in the exercise of the right to self-defense”. However, as the security environment has become more severe, it has been decided that, in the event of an armed attack, the possession of counterstrike capabilities will minimize damage and deter further attacks by using the counterstrike capabilities.
(4)The ability to counterstrike is permitted if the three requirements for the use of force are fulfilled.
The use of force in the exercise of the ability to counterstrike can take place when the new three requirements for the use of force set out in the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security are fulfilled. The three new requirements for the use of force are: (i) an armed attack has occurred against Japan or an armed attack has occurred against another country closely related to Japan, which threatens the existence of Japan and poses a clear danger that the rights of the people to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness will be fundamentally overthrown; (ii) there is no other appropriate means to eliminate the attack, to defend and secure Japan’s existence and to protect its citizens; and (iii) the use of force should be limited to the minimum necessary. It does not aim at the defense of other countries per se.
3. The principle of a peaceful state
Japan has consistently followed the path of a peaceful country since the end of World War II and has adhered to the basic policy of a dedicated defense, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries and upholding the three non-nuclear principles. While striving to secure and maintain counterstrike capabilities to protect the existence of the country and its people as legally possible, the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region should be improved and the occurrence of direct threats to Japan prevented and reduced by strengthening the Japan-US alliance and enhancing relations of trust and cooperation with partners in and outside the region. Furthermore, it is always necessary to play a leading role in strengthening the international order and resolving disputes based on universal values and rules through everyday diplomatic efforts, and to aim to improve global security relations.