By Ekaterina Zolotova* – Geopolitical Futures
They are more worried about their day-to-day lives than the palace intrigue of Kyiv.
By now, tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and therefore Russia and the West, are well documented. Russia amassed troops at the border, the U.S. objected, and the negotiations to resolve the issue have gone nowhere, raising the possibility that a military operation is in the offing. One question ignored in the headlines is whether the Russian people actually want to go to war. So far, the answer appears to be a resounding no.
Russian polling agencies have confirmed as much. Less than 5 percent of Russians are ready to participate in a war, according to one poll. In fact, only 20 percent of Russians are closely following the current standoff. Many public figures argue that Russia does not need a war since there is no real threat, and that there is simply no appetite among the people to fight.
The explanations are many for why this is so. One is geography. Though most of the Russian people live on the “European” side of the country, most of the territory lies on the “Asian” side. Unsurprisingly, the threat of war in Ukraine is perceived as a minor security threat for the Asian part of Russia. For the east, the issue is out of sight, out of mind.
Another is culture. Russia is a multinational state with more than 190 ethnicities and nationalities represented in the predominately Russian population. Put simply, this means many Russians identify with the Ukrainiansliving among them instead of seeing them as enemies. Other nationalities that don’t have a historical and cultural connection with Ukraine don’t really care about the reclamation of Russian borderlands, however important it may be to the government.
Then there is an economic aspect. War is a resource-intensive business, one seen as far less pressing as the Russian economy is stalling, inflation is rising and more than half the population earn incomes below the national average and wait for state-directed projects to improve their living standards. It’s hard for them to care much about geopolitics when they are trying to make ends meet.
Even so, there is a geopolitical explanation for why Russians don’t care so much about the conflict. For them, it’s one issue of many, not an existential issue itself. They see it through the prism of Western-Russian tensions, one that for them is all too similar to the Cold War. Though many Russians blame the U.S. and NATO for the current escalation, those old enough to remember also understand that the fall of the Soviet Union and the associated loss of territory contributed to many of the problems Russia has today. They understand that all these recent events – Moscow setting its red lines, reengaging in the former Soviet space, the arguments about Nord Stream 2, the Belarusian border crisis, NATO exercises in eastern Europe, the constant threat of new sanctions, attention to Cuba and Venezuela from Russia, the demonstrative movement of troops from one part of Russia to another, as well as the reduction of gas supplies through the Yamal gas pipeline – are attempts by both sides to test the possibilities and limits of their opponent.
In that sense, the Ukraine conflict is just one aspect of a larger confrontation between the interests of Russia and the West. For most Americans, it’s a relatively new issue. For most Russians, it’s an issue that has been unfolding since 2014, from the beginning of hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, over which the talk of war has loomed large for a year. So to the average Russian citizen, this is just informational noise.
Fear of Sanctions
What Russians care about is how this whole confrontation will affect their living standards. They are concerned about the West’s response and thus Russia’s future in international trade and finance because fluctuations in the ruble, inflation and the stability of the financial system will affect their well-being.
Indeed, whipping up military and sanctions hysteria usually costs Russia dearly. The economy is already suffering from accelerating inflation, currency depreciation, stock market crashes and foreign exits from government securities. Conflict-related uncertainty causes an outflow of capital as foreign investments freeze in anticipation of possible sanctions. In January 2022, the share of foreign investment in Russian government bonds decreased to 18.8 percent compared to 34.9 percent in March 2020.
Moreover, the Russian ruble is especially sensitive to events like this. Just the announcement that sanctions were possible caused the ruble to fall. It likewise fell at the end of January when the U.S. Embassy recommended that American citizens leave Ukraine. A weak ruble is worse for Russian citizens than it is for the state, which can still find ways to patch up holes in the budget. People buy foreign products like cars, smartphones and household appliances, so a weak ruble drives up the costs of their consumption.
There are also more general fears that a military engagement would disrupt Russian gas supplies to Europe and food supplies to Asia, Africa and the Middle East, leading to higher prices at home. These fears are not unfounded: The International Monetary Fund recently noted that a possible escalation of the conflict would lead to an increase in energy prices and further acceleration of inflation in the world.
For all these reasons, most Russians aren’t interested in the Ukraine conflict. To the extent that they are, it’s part of a bigger problem in which further deterioration in ties between Russia and the West could harm their quality of life. They live their lives worried about the pandemic, their bottom lines, difficulties in the economy and future sanctions regimes. But not Kyiv itself.
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* Ekaterina Zolotova is an analyst for Geopolitical Futures. Prior to Geopolitical Futures, Ms. Zolotova participated in several research projects devoted to problems and prospects of Russia’s integration into the world economy. Ms. Zolotova has a specialist degree in international economic relations from Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. In addition, Ms. Zolotova studied international trade and international integration processes.
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